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This Article looks at the intersection between the war on terror
and the law of religious liberty as it applies to Muslim Americans.
Focusing on the Muslim charity cases of the post-9/11 era, the essay
argues that Muslim American religious liberty claims have been
marginalized not because federal judges have internalized popular fears
of Muslims as dangerous, but because of two doctrinal dynamics internal
to First Amendment law. First, the law of material support of terrorism
. Associate Professor of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since
2010, the author has taught at the University of Maine School of Law, where this
work was completed in near-final form. A special thanks to Erica James for reading
several versions of this article and suggesting how to improve it. I am indebted to the
staff of First Amendment Law Review for meticulous editing, and especially to
editor-in-chief Ethridge "Britt" Ricks for his high standards, patience, and empathy.
Bill Marshall's deep understanding of and passion for the First Amendment inspired
me to pursue this subject further; I cannot thank him enough for his generosity as
well as the brilliance of his example. Thanks also to Zach Heiden, Rich Schragger,
Harvey Silverglate, Ramzi Kassem, Jenny Wriggins, Dave Owen, Mel Zarr, Aziz
Rana, Greg Kalscheur, Dmitry Bam, Sarah Schindler, Christopher McCrudden, Peter
Pitegoff, Marty Rogoff, Dave Cluchey, Kay Guinane, Deirdre Smith, Aziz Huq,
Laura Underkuffler, participants in the University of Michigan Legal Theory
Workshop, and the Suffolk Law School faculty for conversations and reactions to
sketches or drafts. Zach Caunter was an exceptionally helpful aide to this project.
Thanks to Tammie Snow and Ryen Schimerman for additional research assistance,
and to Sherry McCall for help with interlibrary loans. It goes without saying that
none of these persons is responsible for the views expressed here. Disclosure: from
2005 to April 2007, the author represented Emadeddin Z. Muntasser in United States
v. Muntasser (Crim. No. 05-40026-FDS) and Muntasser v. Ridge (Civ. No. 04-
11259-RWZ), both litigated in Federal District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. While neither case is discussed herein, the criminal action involved
tax fraud charges against the former leaders of a Boston-based Muslim charity.
overrides religious liberty claims with the principle of fungibility, which
denotes an organization's inherent ability to offset the cost of illegal
activities with innocent funds. That principle, systematically conflating
legal and illegal forms of religious exercise, effectively turns a
longstanding requirement of strict scrutiny, the least restrictive means
test, on its head. Second, non-establishment and church autonomy have
shifted the ground beneath free exercise. Because separation of church
and state seems to require a "hands off' approach to the regulation of
religious institutions, the sweeping measures of counterterrorism strategy
fill the void. The Article points to Britain's relative success in pursuing
less drastic strategies against an establishmentarian backdrop. That
experience suggests that fungibility is not so much wrong as irrelevant
and unnecessary where proof of actual support for or knowledge of a
specific act of terrorist violence is available. Nonetheless, fungibility is
here to stay for the foreseeable future. The Article concludes by taking
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INTRODUCTION
The church-state field has many general "models" and standards
that operate as the functional equivalent of an algorithm. Plug in the
government on one side and any religious party (Quaker, Catholic,
Buddhist, Jewish, etc.) on the other, and a "neutral" theory of religious
liberty should generate a correct result that applies across the board,
independent of culture, politics, and history. Thus, we have theories of
"equal liberty" and "equal liberty of conscience," prescriptions of "no
money and no coercion," statements of "substantive neutrality" (itself
defined in opposition to "formal neutrality"), "church autonomy," and
now "freedom of the church"-to take a few of the more notable recent
examples.' The impulse to justify or critique one or another form of
1. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2007); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS
EQUALITY (2008); NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOuT IT (2005); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
993 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1373 (1981); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the
Church?, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-061 (Aug. 17, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1911412. See also ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013); Richard
Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L.
REV. 917 (recommending reliance on a general theory of conscientious objection in
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religious freedom in abstract terms seems a necessary and unceasing part
of the law and religion enterprise, notwithstanding legal-historical
accounts of religious liberty that make clear no single theory of church-
state law can account for the tremendous pluralism and dynamism of
2
American religious conflict and collaboration. The case law, meanwhile,
follows a judicial variation on this theme: identify the governing legal
standard, be it constitutional or statutory, boil down the messy religious
and other particulars of the case to the dispositive legal issue, and then
derive a neutral result in terms that can be justified on general grounds.
This tendency is understandable, even commendable. Casuistry
in the area of church and state, as in any area of law, can be a bad thing.
Most of us believe that like cases should be treated alike, and that, in
principle, no area of law is incapable of being analyzed with such
evenhandedness. The study of religious liberty in the era of the "war on
lieu of institution-based religious liberty arguments). Cf 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 1 (2006) ("[S]ound
approaches to the state's treatment of religion cannot be collapsed into any single
formula or set of formulas."). For a critique of general theories of secularism and
neutrality in the law of religious freedom, see William P. Marshall, Progressives, the
Religion Clauses, and the Limits of Secularism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 231-
42 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). See also Mark Tushnet, The
Emerging Principle ofAccommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L. J. 1691,
1691, 1714 (1988) (comparing the shortcomings of the "accommodation" principle
to those of "neutrality"). MARC 0. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 1 (2013), which appeared after this article was submitted for publication,
is a thoughtful critique of theory's "self-assured, single-minded drive to evaluate,
justify, and adjudge." I am uncertain where DeGirolami's approach, with its reliance
on the "social and doctrinal history" of the religion clauses, would leave us as to the
issues addressed in this article.
2. See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS
VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA (2010); EVAN HAEFELI, NEW
NETHERLAND AND THE DUTCH ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 8 (2012)
(arguing that relationships of conflict and accommodation between two or more
different religious groups, and not any putatively abstract category of "tolerance" or
"toleration," drive the story of early American religious liberty). Note the comment
on the jacket cover of Gordon's book by the legal historian William Nelson,
contrasting historical with theoretical accounts of religious liberty.
3. But see ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEVEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY:
A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988). The basic approach to constitutional
interpretation at issue here is perhaps best captured in Herbert Wechsler's famous
essay, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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terror,"4 however, inevitably entails a disproportionate emphasis on the
legal condition of one particular American religious community: Muslim
Americans. And the generalizing scholarship just described does not like
to focus on specific religious communities, for such a focus seems to
exude an air of casuistry and identity politics that is incapable of making
any genuine "theoretical" contributions to the law of religious liberty.
There is some validity to that concern, too. But finally it participates in a
catch-22 situation: because the law of religious liberty is itself conceived
of in general, theoretical terms, any analysis of that law that fails to
match its generality and neutrality inevitably falls short of the desired
mark.
One result is that we have very little understanding of what has
happened to the law of religious liberty in the context of the war on
terror, despite concerns that Muslim Americans have increasingly faced
profiling, political and social marginalization, and worse in the years
since 9/11.5 The leading scholarly hypothesis infers that federal judges
4. Scare quotes around the phrase "war on terror" are omitted hereafter: there
is a longstanding debate, not to be resolved here, about the best way to describe the
American government's military and law enforcement responses to 9/11. For a
glimpse at the bureaucratic dimensions of this debate, see Scott Wilson & Al
Kamen, 'Global War on Terror' Is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-25/politics/36918330_1 _congressional-
testimony-obama-administration-memo. See also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 103-06
(2007).
5. More than half of Muslim Americans (54%) believe the federal
government's counter-terrorism policies "single out Muslims for increased
surveillance and monitoring." Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly
Mainstream, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 4, 36-37 (May 22, 2007). That conviction is
especially strong (73%) among native-born Muslim Americans-less so among
foreign-born (47%)-and corresponds to Muslim Americans having the lowest level
of confidence in the FBI of any major American faith group. Id.; Muslim Americans:
Faith, Freedom, and the Future: Examining U.S. Muslims' Political, Social, and
Spiritual Engagement 10 Years After September 11, ABU DHABI GALLUP CENTER 24
(Aug. 2011) (regarding the FBI statistic). Cf CHRISTIAN JOPPKE & TOHN TORPEY,
LEGAL INTEGRATION OF ISLAM: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON 126-136 (2013)
(discussing evidence that Muslim Americans feel themselves to be, and are in fact,
substantially integrated into the American economic and political order). These
indicators of incorporation and marginalization point in similarly mixed directions
with respect to Arab Americans, though the Detroit Arab American Study reports
that Arab-American confidence in the federal government is actually higher than
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have internalized popular fears of Muslim America as a source of danger
to national security.6 While we cannot exclude this possibility, as an
account of legal doctrine it is, at best, incomplete. The problem with this
answer is not simply that it assumes facts not in evidence. The
hypothesis also reflects an overbroad framing of the question it purports
to answer. A litigant can assert many different kinds of religious liberty
claims in an American court, and Muslim Americans have appealed to
every available category in recent years.7 Indeed, in the period from 1996
to 2005, Muslim Americans, who by most accounts make up somewhere
between one and two percent of the population, had a hand in about
8fifteen percent of the religious liberty claims brought in federal courts.
Therefore, the question cannot be why Muslim Americans, against a
backdrop of real and feared marginalization and persecution, have not
embraced the protections of the American free exercise tradition more
vigorously, as one prominent scholar of law and religion has framed the
issue in passing.9 Nor would it be possible to measure the strength of a
among non-Arabs. ARAB DETROIT 9/11: LIFE IN THE TERROR DECADE 5-6, 13
(Nadeel Abraham et al. eds., 2011). "[T]here are processes of integration and
identification at work in Detroit, and nationally, that representational politics cannot
fully register." Id. at 13.
6. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the
Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231
(2012) (finding that Muslim Americans are slightly more than half as successful as
other religious liberty claimants in the federal courts, and concluding that this
discrepancy is most likely due to judicial internalization of popular associations of
Muslims with terrorism). The evidence that Sisk and Heise adduce is significant, but
the methods they bring to bear on that evidence are unsatisfactory. Statistical
analysis and inferences based on social and cognitive psychology, by themselves,
cannot substitute for an analysis of what judges actually say.
7. See infra Part IC.
8. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 235. The U.S. Census Bureau is barred
from asking questions about religious affiliation on a mandatory basis. Pub. L. No.
94-521, § 214(c), 90 Stat. 2459, 2465 (1976). Estimates of the total size of the
Muslim American population therefore vary widely. A 2010 Pew Research Center
study puts the total at 2,595,000 (0.8% of the total U.S. population). The Future of
the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
163 (Jan. 2011). Other recent estimates range as high as six to seven million. See,
e.g., AKBAR AHMED, JOURNEY INTO AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM 7 (2010).
9. See I DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY
454 (2010) ("With Muslims worried about active persecution arising from the war
on terrorism, they have not been especially active in free exercise litigation.").
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specifically Muslim-American legal activism, whether in religious liberty
or other terms. During the Second World War, when persons of Japanese
descent were detained in internment camps on the American and
Canadian west coasts, "[t]he actions of both white and Japanese
advocates fused in litigation that was appealed to the highest courts."' 0 A
similar merger of civil libertarian and community-level institutional
activism has characterized the post-9/11 period."
A more manageable inquiry, by contrast, would take the measure
of the actual constitutional doctrine that a "fused" Muslim American-
civil libertarian activism has generated in the post-9/11 era. From this
perspective, some notable gaps and omissions stand out, making it
possible to bring the nature of the Muslim-American religious liberty
landscape into greater focus. Most obviously, the Supreme Court has
issued no major pronouncements (positive or negative) on religious
liberty in connection with the war on terror. Nor has it handed down any
significant decisions grounded in substantive due process or free speech
principles with far-reaching religious liberty implications.12 Of course,
10. STEPHANIE BANGARTH, VOICES RAISED IN PROTEST: DEFENDING NORTH
AMERICAN CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY, 1942-49 154 (2008).
11. A skeptic could read the ACLU's 2009 report challenging the crackdown
on Muslim charities-which features Muslim American testimonials to the
"chilling" effect of the government's policies on the free exercise of religion-as the
civil libertarian equivalent of a leading question: is it the lawyer or the client who is
speaking here? See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING
CHARITY: CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE "WAR ON TERRORISM
FINANCING" 89-115 (June 2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default
/files/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith.pdf.
12. The single most important religious liberty holding of the post-2001 era,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n,
565 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), speaks primarily to the church autonomy line
of cases, and has at best only indirect relevance to the free exercise issues raised by
the war on terror. Dismissing a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act
brought by a religious school teacher who was fired from her job, Hosanna-Tabor
holds that the religion clauses require that houses of worship be exempted from
employment anti-discrimination liability whenever the employee qualifies as a
church "minister." Id at ,_ 132 S. Ct. at 707. The Court's most important national
security opinions have involved the Guantanamo issues: the availability of habeas
corpus, the scope of Congress's power to suspend it, and due process. Many other
critical issues arising out of post-9/11 counter-terrorism policies, however-
indefinite detention, torture, rendition, and warrantless electronic surveillance-were
prevented from reaching the high court, through a combination of prudential
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even these silences can be misleading. Perhaps there have simply been
no incursions on religious liberty significant enough to justify the
intervention of the federal courts, so successfully has the American
melting pot managed to integrate Muslim Americans.' 3 This objection
cannot be dismissed altogether.14 President Bush's strong statements in
defense of toleration and Muslim American religious liberty in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 will be remembered as constituting one of
the more generous and hopeful fronts in the war on terror.'5 Although
tremendous pressures have been brought to bear on the scope of some of
our most cherished civil liberties since 9/11, the resistance to those
pressures at the level of constitutional activism has been unrelenting.
doctrines such as standing and ripeness and the discretionary certiorari power. In
2007, for example, the Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of standing a challenge to the
National Security Agency's warrantless electronic surveillance program. ACLU v.
Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1179 (2008).
This year, the Supreme Court decided a similar case emanating from the Second
Circuit on the merits, and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the case for
failure to prove that surveillance of their communications was "certainly
impending." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). See
also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's
dismissal of plaintiff s lawsuit in case alleging constitutional and statutory violations
based on extraordinary rendition, indefinite detention, and torture on grounds that
national security and foreign policy concerns prevented judicial redress), cert.
denied. 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). This is in sharp contrast to the high court in Britain,
which did reach these hot-button controversies. For a brief survey of the British high
court's post-9/11 national security decisions, see Richard J. Maiman, The "War on
Terror" in Court: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Empowerment, in THE
LEGACY OF THE CRASH: HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CHANGED AMERICA AND
BRITAIN 242 (Terrence Casey ed., 2011), available at http://www.british
politicsgroup.org/Maiman.pdf.
13. For an argument that the American melting pot has succeeded in diverting
American Muslims from committing acts of domestic terrorism similar to those
undertaken by co-religionists in Britain and Europe, see Spencer Ackerman,
Religious Protection, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/religious-protection.
14. The claim that Muslim American free exercise claims may simply be less
meritorious than those of other religious groups is addressed and discredited in Sisk
& Heise, supra note 6, at 269-77.
15. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, WHAT CHANGED WHEN EVERYTHING CHANGED:
9/11 AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 125-26 (2013).
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Until recently, however, there has been relatively little debate
about the religious liberty implications of our national security debates.16
This Article takes on that task. The integration and stigmatization theses
operate on too many different registers (religious, economic, political,
etc.) and across too many different areas of law to be described in a
single article. By contrast, this study advances a pair of doctrinal
explanations for the fate of religious liberty law after 9/11. It does so by
focusing squarely on a set of highly controversial cases within the larger
universe of Muslim American religious liberty jurisprudence: the Muslim
charity prosecutions from 9/11 to the present (the "Terror Decade," as it
has been called).17
For several reasons, these cases permit us to bring the question
of what has happened to religious liberty claims in the war on terror into
the sharper focus that it requires. First, the Muslim charity cases cohere
around a common problem that seems to leave no room for compromise:
the head-on conflict between religious conduct that is central to the self-
understanding of a major world faith, on the one hand, and material
support of terrorism laws that rank among the most powerful tools in the
federal government's counterterrorism arsenal, on the other.' 8 The
crackdown on Muslim charities has been a key front, if not the single
most important front, of the financial war on terror. And the practice of
zakat (mandatory charitable giving) is one of the five pillars of Islam, the
Muslim variation on the Abrahamic theme of tithing shared by
Christians, Jews, and other religious groups.
16. Cf Malick W. Ghachem, Of "Scalpels" and "Sledgehammers": Religious
Liberty and the Policing of Muslim Charities in Britain and America Since 9/11, 9
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 25 (2009-2010); Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling
Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833
(2011); Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, The Law and Strategy of
Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125 (2012). MARGULIES, supra note 15, at
10, documents the growth of an anti-Islamic narrative in the United States that, in his
view, was mostly silent immediately after 9/11 and gained traction only years later.
But he does not attempt to analyze this narrative at the level of church-state law.
17. Cf ARAB DETROIT 9/11, supra note 5, at 3 ("[T]he Terror Decade was a
time in which national security was persistently defined as something Arabs and
Muslims threaten, and this definition placed serious constraints on how Arab and
Muslim Americans could identify as U.S. citizens.").
18. See infra Part I.A-B.
19. For a discussion of the centrality of charity and poor relief to the history of
the Abrahamic faiths, see generally PETER BROWN, THROUGH THE EYE OF A NEEDLE:
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Second, charity and poor relief have been integral to the one of
the master narratives of American history: the expansion of religious
liberty and the integration of previously despised minorities into the
national fabric. A controversy over charitable solicitation marks the
beginning of our contemporary era of (incorporated) religious liberty,
with the Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut,20 holding
that the concept of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause required application of the free exercise clause to the
states.21 And the movement for "Tri-Faith America" in the postwar era,
which replaced the older notion that America was a distinctly
"Protestant" nation with a new embrace of Protestantism, Catholicism
and Judaism as separate but equally American faiths-began with
Protestant relief agencies collaborating with their Catholic and Jewish
counterparts in the 1920s to consolidate resources and promote an ethos
of interfaith goodwill.22 Charity has been both a key driving force in the
modem American law of religious liberty and a conduit for religious
pluralism and coexistence.23 These two developments now intersect in
far more conflicted ways, but their interrelationship remains as revealing
as ever before. What served at one time in American history as a fulcrum
WEALTH, THE FALL OF ROME, AND THE MAKING OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE WEST, 350-
550 AD (2012).
20. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
21. Id. (reversing criminal conviction for violating Connecticut statute
prohibiting solicitation for religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes without
approval of Secretary of Public Welfare). Sarah Barringer Gordon usefully
demarcates the history of the American law of church and state into three separate
periods: an initial and extended era of disestablishment at the state level that runs
from the 1770s to the 1840s, an intermediate period running from the 1840s to the
mid-twentieth century during which the states (not the federal government)
determined the relationship between religion and law, and a new and distinctively
modem constitutional world that comes into view in the 1940s, when the free
exercise and establishment clauses were finally applied to the states. GORDON, supra
note 2, at 3-14.
22. KEVIN M. SCHULTZ, TRI-FAITH AMERICA: How CATHOLICS AND JEWS
HELD POSTWAR AMERICA TO ITS PROTESTANT PROMISE 26-29 (2011).
23. In addition to Cantwell, see, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)
(holding that a state charitable solicitation law that exempted organizations from
taxation only if they receive more than half of their total contributions from
members or affiliated organizations violated the establishment clause's prohibition
on denominational preferences).
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for the expansion of civil liberties and the incorporation of unpopular
minorities (Catholics in particular) has become a battleground on which
religious freedom and other individual rights have typically been on the
defensive.
Third, the Muslim charity cases have enacted a "good
Muslim/bad Muslim" dynamic that has extended their implications far
beyond the immediate parties at issue. The Bush administration's
otherwise laudable effort, in the days and weeks after 9/11, to distinguish
a peaceful and "innocent" form of Islam from the extremist fringe
associated with Al Qaida "could not hide the central message of such
discourse: unless proved to be 'good,' every Muslim was presumed to be
'bad.' All Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials
by joining in a war against 'bad Muslims."' 2 4 The Muslim charity cases
pose the difficult question of the relationship between the (suspect)
Muslim individuals and organizations under investigation or indictment,
and the (presumably innocent) Muslims who participate as charitable
25
donors, volunteers, or clients of these organizations. On one hand, in a
technical sense, the named defendants and investigative targets are
indeed the only persons and charities whose conduct has been implicated
by post-9/11 crackdown. On the other hand, the prosecution of these
cases has sometimes evoked a sense of guilt by association based on
tenuous links and innovative theories of liability-raising questions
about whether our usual standards of culpability and fair notice in the
criminal law have been satisfied. One example is the government's
identification of nearly every major Muslim American organization as
unindicted coconspirators, in a case involving what was once the largest
26
Muslim American charity. Where to draw the boundary between these
24. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD
WAR, AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR 15 (2004); see also KAMBIZ GHANEABASSIRI, A
HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AMERICA: FROM THE NEW WORLD TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER
373-77 (2010).
25. See infra Part II.A-C.
26. See United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., No. 3:04-CR-
240-G, 2007 WL 2004458 (N.D. Tex. 2007), available at http://www.investigative
project.org/docurnents/casedocs/423.pdf. (listing unindicted co-conspirators); see
also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 53-55; DAVID COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 58-64 (2005); IBRAHIM WARDE, THE PRICE OF FEAR: THE TRUTH
BEHIND THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERROR 139 (2007) (noting the susceptibility of
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cases and the legal and moral standing of the Muslim American
27community has been left somewhat unclear in their aftermath.
By far the most important reason to study these cases, however,
is that they dramatize two crucial doctrinal dynamics in the
contemporary law of religious liberty. The first of these dynamics
involves the interaction between free exercise and the doctrine of
"fungibility." The real driving force in the Muslim charity cases becomes
the merger of First Amendment doctrine with the principle of fungibility,
an economic term that, in this context, describes the ability of a
designated terrorist organization to convert (innocent charitable) money
into other, illegal uses. As Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit put
it in 2002, "money is fungible; giving support intended to aid an
organization's peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for
,,28
terrorist acts. By this standard, there can be no distinction between a
charity's legitimate and illegitimate activities, no matter how isolated the
29
latter may be. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court, ruling
on free speech and association rather than religious liberty grounds in a
case brought by a secular organization, upheld the application of the
material support of terrorism laws to individuals seeking to support only
the peaceful activities of designated organizations (as, for example, by
Muslim charities to "six degrees of separation" logic in the financial war on terror,
given the very large numbers of donors and recipients).
27. The lack of clarity has itself left at least some Muslim Americans confused
about the actual state of material support law. Would it criminalize a donor who
innocently gives to an organization not listed on the Specially Designated Nationals
list at the time of the donation but that is subsequently designated as such? See
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 78-80. There have been some
cases of individual Muslim American donors arrested or investigated for their
donations to legally operating Muslim charities in the United States, though not all
of these arrests and indictments have officially relied on charitable contributions. Id.
at 73-75.
28. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000).
29. Compare WARDE, supra note 26, at 130 (discussing the blurring of the line
between "[i]ntent and consequence, the legitimate and the illegitimate, the deliberate
and the unwitting" in the crackdown on Muslim charities), with MARIEKE DE GOEDE,
SPECULATIVE SECURITY: THE POLITICS OF PURSUING TERRORIST MONIES 127-28
(2012) (arguing that the doctrine of fungibility makes "the boundaries between
legitimate aid and illegitimate material support for terrorism . . . nearly impossible to
draw here").
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helping them to petition the United Nations for political change). 30 It did
so largely by raising the expansive doctrine of fungibility to the status of
a quasi-constitutional principle: because money is fungible, there can be
no free speech or free association protection for an individual's desire to
contribute peaceful, legal forms of support to a banned entity." Well
before the Supreme Court intervened, however, that principle had been
developed in the lower courts during the Terror Decade so as to apply to
the context of religious charitable giving.
In the post-9/11 era, fungibility has come to override both free
speech and free exercise interests. In any case where a terrorist
designation is at issue, fungibility neutralizes all but the most
uncontroversial constitutional claims, subject only to the limits that one
appellate court (the Ninth Circuit) has identified in favor of a non-
Muslim charity party.32 The squeezing out of religiously-inflected
political dissent is a major by-product of the material support cases, and
has implications for both secular and religious individuals and entities.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Humanitarian Law Project
envisioned that the fungibility doctrine would have a remarkable
capacity to suppress core forms of protected political speech. The
Muslim charity cases show that religious conduct and expression are
30. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010).
31. Id. at 2725-26.
32. In this sense, fungibility in the material support context can be compared to
the Supreme Court's rejection of "divertibility" as a rationale for finding an
establishment clause violation in the parochial school aid context. See Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 820, 822, 824 (2000). In Mitchell, a plurality held that a
concern over the divertibility of secular aid for religious purposes is misplaced
"because it is boundless - enveloping all aid, no matter how trivial - and thus has
only the most attenuated (if any) link to any realistic concern for preventing an
'establishment of religion."' Id. Relying on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Mitchell, subsequent lower court decisions have extended the life of the
divertibility rationale by restricting its application to situations in which secular
government aid is in fact diverted to religious indoctrination, or where the
government provides money aid directly to a religious institution. See, e.g., Cmty.
House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
Mitchell is restricted to situations of actual diversion); Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that Mitchell did
not involve direct money payments from the government to a religious institution).
33. Holder, 561 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2731-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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equally, if not more, vulnerable to that doctrine. In both contexts the
basic reason is the same: fungibility upends a basic requirement of
traditional strict scrutiny-that the government must show its burden on
protected speech or conduct is the least restrictive means available-and
imposes on defendants the burden of demonstrating that their speech or
conduct has no possibility whatsoever of facilitating the work of
terrorism. That is an especially noteworthy reversal of First Amendment
doctrine, whatever one thinks about the results in these cases.
The second of these doctrinal dynamics is that religious liberty in
the free exercise sense has been absorbed by the paradoxical implications
of non-establishment and the law of church (or religious institutional)
autonomy. This point can be most clearly made in comparative fashion,
vis-a-vis the British experience. The British establishmentarian tradition,
in general, permits a greater degree of government intervention into the
lives of religious institutions than the American tradition of separation.
Although religion and politics intersect to a much greater degree in the
United States than in Europe, when it comes to the institutional
separation of church and state, American law is, in fact, remarkably
strict.34 The consequence of this separation is that American law
enforcement is endowed with relatively few tools for policing the
conduct of religious institutions (such as charities) other than those the
criminal law makes available for violations of public order generally.
The British system has at its disposal an array of "scalpel"-like tools,
including the removal of individual officers and trustees from a charity's
leadership, or the temporary transfer of a charity's management. In a few
critical cases, those tools have permitted the British authorities to avoid a
head-on collision with Muslim charitable institutions and mosques in the
United Kingdom.35 By contrast, the American tradition of church
autonomy is expressly predicated on a rejection of English rules that
permitted civil authorities to inquire into matters of religious doctrine
and practice or to exercise control over internal institutional leadership.36
34. See James Q. Whitman, Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide,
in LAW, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY: THEMES IN THE LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND LEGAL
HISTORY OF LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN 233-50 (Robert W. Gordon & Morton J.
Horwitz eds., 2011).
35. See infra Part lI.A-B.
36. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727-28 (1872) (rejecting the English
"departure from doctrine" approach in deciding whether to create an implied trust in
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This has left Muslim American charities with essentially two
options: make their own preemptive use of the scalpel so as to avoid
attracting the attention of law enforcement in the first place, or accept the
risks associated with the expansive complicity logic of the material
support of terrorism laws.37 Whether Muslim charities ought themselves
to have made greater use of the scalpel in the years before 9/11 is an
important question, though not one that I attempt to answer in any
detailed way in this paper. In some cases, as in the matter of North
London's Finsbury Park Mosque discussed below, mosque leaders did
make efforts to expel an especially problematic imam, but his following
within the mosque community created a stalemate that was resolved only
by the intervention of charitable regulators.3 8 In other cases, the record of
Muslim institutional tolerance for violent extremism is more ambiguous,
and the argument for the use of the sledgehammer correspondingly more
persuasive. In particular, what I have seen of the evidence in the Holy
Land Foundation criminal case (discussed in Part II.C below) has led me
to conclude that there are circumstances where a line must be drawn in
the sand. But the line in question should and need not be the one that
fungibility draws: where there is proof of concrete support for or
knowledge of specific acts of terrorist violence, fungibility per se should
be irrelevant. 39 Yet that principle has become the key tool in the
favor of the local faction in a property dispute between rival factions of a
Presbyterian church); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 702-04. This
contrast between English and American law requires some qualification, as there is
case law in Britain that, in certain contexts, prohibits courts from assessing questions
of religious doctrine in civil litigation involving rival factions of a religious
institution. For further discussion, see infra Part 1Il.D.
37. Hosanna-Tabor is neither a criminal case nor one that, strictly speaking,
falls into the church autonomy category. However, it relies heavily on the church
autonomy line of cases. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 704-05.
Along with Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that the exemption of religious
organizations from religious employment discrimination liability when applied to an
organization's secular activities does not violate the Establishment Clause),
Hosanna-Tabor strongly reinforces the predicament outlined here.
38. See infra Part II.B.2.
39. A related question is: what standard of proof should apply in cases
involving the material support of terrorism statutes? The civil cases involve a typical
preponderance of the evidence standard, but as I explain in Part LA below, no
hearing or prior notice is required before the government can seize the assets of a
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prosecution of nearly every one of the Muslim charity cases, with the
resulting harm to First Amendment doctrine that this Article outlines.
In addition to placing great pressure on religious liberty interests,
many of these cases also happened to raise sensitive questions of
American foreign policy (Holy Land Foundation very much included,
since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and America's role therein sat quite
transparently at its core). The argument for prosecutorial and judicial
restraint seems accordingly strong. But the federal government did not
follow a course of restraint. In nearly all cases following the attacks of
9/11, the Department of Justice opted to enforce the material support of
terrorism laws, resulting in across-the-board freezing of assets,
designation of entire entities as terrorist organizations, and aggressive
criminal prosecutions.40 In the meantime, we have adopted a much more
indulgent policy towards wealthy and powerful financial institutions that
have been found to engage in many of the same kinds of violations with
which Muslim charities have been charged. In the case of the
international banks, the Department of Justice has only very recently
begun to bring enforcement actions, and for the most part has allowed
the offending parties to settle their cases with digestible fines while
avoiding the death sentence of criminal indictment and prosecution.4'
targeted organization or designate it as a terrorist group. The standard in criminal
cases is, of course, beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is an interesting question
whether that amorphous standard can have any real meaning in a context where the
rule of fungibility applies.
40. See infra Part I.A.
41. The key players in this story are HSBC and Standard Chartered, both
London-based banks with operations in the United States and various locations in the
Middle East. HSBC was found to have transferred money through American
subsidiaries on behalf of governments on the State Department's list of terrorism
sponsors, notably Iran. It is also alleged to have moved tainted money from Saudi
banks with ties to terrorist groups. The phenomenon extends well beyond these two
banks, however. To date, the Department of Justice has reached deferred prosecution
agreements to settle money laundering and/or terrorism financing charges in the
following cases: United States v. Royal Bank of Scotland (former ABM Amro
Bank), No. 1:10-CR-00124-CKK (D. D.C., May 10, 2010); United States v. ING
Bank, N.V. (D. D.C., No. 1:12-CR-00136-PLF, June 12, 2012); United States v.
Credit Suisse AG, No. 1:09-CR-00352-RCL (D. D.C., Dec. 16, 2009); United States
v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 1:10-CR-00218-EGS (D. D.C., Aug. 16, 2010); and
United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, No. 1:09-CR-00007-ESH (D. D.C., Jan. 9,
2009);. Standard Chartered settled on Dec. 12, 2012. Noting criticism that the federal
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How to explain that particular disparity is a task for another
article. Here I argue only that the federal government's policy towards
Muslim American charities is, in significant measure, a function of the
American law of church and state, which makes available the more
sweeping measures just described and seems to make other, more
targeted and nuanced measures off limits.42 A corollary of this argument
is that American policy cannot be explained by the suggestion that
Muslim American charities are inherently more threatening or corrupt
than their British counterparts (or establishment banks, for that matter),
nor can it be explained by official anti-Muslim bias.
While the perception that "scalpel"-like measures conflict with
non-establishment contains more than a grain of truth, it also serves to
caricature the separation of church and state. But I have no illusion that
we can better protect religious liberty in the second "Terror Decade"
simply by turning to the British experience for a way out of the impasse.
government should have sought to hold HSBC criminally liable, a federal judge
approved HSBC's deferred prosecution agreement on July 3, 2013. Chad Bray,
Judge Approves HSBC Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Money Laundering
Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SBl0001424127887323936404578582451462472318.html. All of these banks
remain eminently viable financial institutions as of this writing. See Neil Barofsky,
Too Big to Jail: Our Banking System's Latest Disgrace, THE NEw REPUBLIC (Dec.
12, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/
blog/plank/111041/too-big-jail-our-banking-systems-latest-disgrace; Editorial, Too
Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at A38, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html?_r-0; Ben Protess &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, DEALBOOK; Bank Is Said to Avoid Charges Over
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012), http://query.nytimes.com/gst
/fullpage.html?res=940DEFDE IF3DF932A25751CIA9649D8B63; Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Prosecutors Link Money from China to Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012,
at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/business/inquiry-looks-at-
chinese-banks-iran-role.html; Mark Scott, Inquiry into Iran Deals is an Abrupt
Reversal at Standard Chartered, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at B4; Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Regulator Says Bank Helped Iran Hide Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/business/standard-
chartered-bank-accused-of-hiding-transactions-with-iranians.html; Mark Scott &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC May Face Charges in a Laundering Inquiry, N.Y
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012, at Bl; Jimmy Gurul6, Are Some Banks Too Big to Prosecute?,
CNN.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/16/opinion/banks-too-
big-to-prosecute.
42. See infra Part II.A.
The wartime Muslim charity cases are not likely to be repeated in
anything like their past configuration, and protection of "civilian"
religious liberty in contemporary America remains essentially robust-
for Muslims as for followers of other faiths.4 3 I will be content to have
mapped the constitutional landscape of the charity cases as part of an
exercise in contemporary legal history that helps to flesh out our
understanding of the complexities of the American law of religious
liberty in other contexts.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part One
situates the crackdown on Muslim American charity in its legal and
religious framework, including the Humanitarian Law Project decision,
the Islamic theology of zakat, and free exercise law. Part Two turns to
the heart of the doctrinal analysis: the emerging relationship between
First Amendment and material support law as reflected above all in the
doctrine of fungibility. Part Three shows that the dilemmas created by
this relationship are partly a function of crude notions of non-
establishment and church autonomy, and stand in sharp contrast to the
British experience of relative success in regulating but not dismantling
Muslim charity through less restrictive measures. In the Article's final
part, I outline the implications of this analysis for the second Terror
Decade now unfolding and suggest what that analysis has to say about
some other leading religious liberty issues of the day, particularly those
involving the Catholic Church.
I. THE LEGAL AND RELIGIOUS FRAMEWORK
A. The Basic Structure ofMaterial Support Law
The body of law known as material support of terrorism is a mix
of (civil) administrative and criminal enforcement strategies that together
produce a more powerful set of counterterrorism tools than criminal law
43. See JOPPKE & TORPEY, supra note 5, at 114-138. By the same token,
Joppke's and Torpey's straightforward conclusion that "Islam in America seems to
have been the dog that didn't bark - a nonproblem, at least from a constitutional-
legal perspective," strikes me as overly simplistic; not surprisingly, their work
contains little in the way of actual legal analysis in the American context. Id. at 116.
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alone could provide.4 In fact, material support law can be seen as an
adjunct of an administrative process created by the 1977 International
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) and the 1996 Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
The former statute, IEEPA, authorizes the President to prohibit
international financial flows into and out of the United States in response
to "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole
or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares
a national emergency with respect to such threat."4 5 Pursuant to this law,
the president may "block during the pendency of an investigation" any
holdings or transactions involving "any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."4 6
Another provision permits the President, whenever the United States is at
war or under attack, to "confiscate any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign
organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned,
authorized, aided, or engaged in . . . hostilities or attacks against the
United States." 47
The contemporary reliance on material support of terrorism law
dates back to developments that occurred about two decades after the
passage of IEEPA. In January 1995, citing his IEEPA powers, President
Clinton issued an executive order, E.O. 12,947, that designated as
"Specially Designated Terrorists" (SDTs) certain groups and individuals
believed to pose a serious threat to the (then still viable) Middle East
peace process, thereby defining that threat as one "to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."4 8 The near
total domination of what is now called the SDN list by Islamic and
44. See Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and
United States, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 432-33 (2006). The technical language is
material support for (rather than of) terrorism. I use the more colloquial form here.
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1977). IEEPA was in fact an amendment to the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act. The emergency powers in question originated in the
First rather than the Second World War.
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(B) (2012).
47. Id. at § 1702(a)(C) (2012).
48. See Wadie Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86
IND. L.J. 543, 557 (2011).
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Arabic-sounding names begins here; Hamas (the Islamic Resistance
Movement) and Hizballah (the Party of God) were two of the central
targets of the order.49 President Clinton's order also gave the Treasury
Secretary the power to add domestic persons to the list, and delegated to
the Secretary of State the authority to add other "foreign persons."50 The
latter authority is now codified in a section of the Immigration and
Nationality Act titled "designation of foreign terrorist organizations"
(FTOs).
A few months after E.O. 12,947 was issued, Congress passed the
AEDPA statute, and it was signed into law by President Clinton one year
521
later, in 1996. A hastily arranged marriage of habeas corpus and
counterterrorism reforms, AEDPA's central counterterrorism provision
49. See id.
50. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2004). The SDN list is short for "Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons" list and is compiled by the Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control. It includes all SDTs, FTOs, and Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), among other categories. Any one
organization can have more than one of these statuses. Thus Hamas was added to the
FTO category in October 1997. An online search engine for the SDN database was
created by the Treasury Department at the behest of the advocacy organization
Muslim Advocates, as a compromise in lieu of providing a so-called "white list" of
acceptable Muslim charities. See Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List Search, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (May 28, 2013),
http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas.gov/. On Muslim American petitions to the Treasury
Department to release lists of acceptable charities, see WARDE, supra note 26, at
148.
52. The story behind AEDPA's passage is complex. In April 1995, Timothy
McVeigh carried out the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. Shortly
thereafter, Congress approved the hastily arranged marriage of counter-terrorism and
habeas corpus reforms that is AEDPA. The consensus is that AEDPA's passage was
greatly facilitated-even if it was not initially prompted-by the Oklahoma City
tragedy. Clinton's signing occurred on the heels of a spate of suicide bombing
attacks on Israeli civilians by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization.
Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States
Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (2001); Lee Kovarsky,
AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 447
(2008); John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REV.
259, 269 (2006); Said, supra note 48, at 557-58; LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF
COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 149 (2008) (noting that
"[a]lthough US nationals planned and carried out the [Oklahoma City] attack, many
of the [AEDPA] provisions .. . dealt with foreign threats").
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created a fifteen-year mandatory minimum penalty for the attempted or
actual provision of "material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization."53 "Material support and resources" were defined to
include "any property, tangible or intangible, or service," excepting only
medicine and religious materials.54 Despite congressional support for
these more aggressive counterterrorism measures, the Department of
Justice prosecuted only three material support cases between AEDPA's
adoption and 9/11, none involving Al Qaeda (which did not appear on
the FTO list until October 1999).
The next decisive moment for material support law came with
President Bush's Executive Order 13,244, dated September 23, 2001.
Again citing the IEEPA, Bush's order designated Al Qaeda, Osama Bin
Laden, and his associates as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists"
(SDGTs) and delegated to the State and Treasury Departments the
authority to name more of the same (in the respective categories of
56foreign and domestic persons). This order laid the groundwork for the
crackdown on Muslim American charities. By December 2001, the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had
designated and frozen the assets of the three largest Muslim charities in
the United States: the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
(HLF, based in Dallas, TX), Global Relief Foundation (GRF, based in a
Chicago suburb), and Benevolence International Foundation (BIF,
located in Ohio). All told, OFAC has closed six U.S.-based, Muslim
American charities through the SDGT designation process, closed a
seventh by freezing its assets pending an investigation, and raided
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2012).
54. Id at § 2339A(b)(1) (2012). The full list of statutory examples is as
follows: "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials." Id. As amended, the term
"training" is defined as "instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as
opposed to general knowledge," and "expert advice or assistance" is defined to mean
"advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge." Id. at § 2339A(b)(2-3) (2012).
55. Said, supra note 48, at 558 n.93.
56. Exec. Order No. 13,244, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
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another seven charities, two of which have since closed down as a result
of negative publicity.57
In the years since 9/11, the material support infrastructure has
been amended several times and repeatedly challenged in court. The
2001 PATRIOT Act expanded the list of exemplary support and
resources to include "expert advice or assistance." In 2004, responding
to Ninth Circuit litigation in the Humanitarian Law Project case,
Congress further amended the material support law to require that the
defendant have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist
organization or engages in terrorist activity as defined elsewhere in the
59federal criminal code. That was the state of the material support statute
when, after years of back and forth between Congress and the lower
federal courts, it finally reached the Supreme Court.
Humanitarian Law Project, handed down in 2010, is an
enormously complicated decision that I can only briefly summarize here.
Represented by Georgetown University law professor David Cole, the
plaintiffs' chief contention was that the First Amendment rights of free
speech and free association protected their ability to provide material
support to the nonviolent humanitarian and political activities of two
designated organizations: the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Put differently, the plaintiffs
argued that they could not be prosecuted for material support for
terrorism absent evidence that they specifically intended their donations
to support the illegal activities of the organizations, and they urged the
Court to impose such a requirement of specific intent on the statute,
notwithstanding the 2004 amendment to AEDPA.
57. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 7.
58. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 377 (2001).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). See also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
supra note 11, at 28. Although the U.S.-based charitable organizations targeted by
federal investigators since 9/11 have been designated as SDGTs rather than FTOs,
these classifications have effectively overlapped as a result of real and alleged ties
between American-based Muslim charities and Muslim charities headquartered
overseas.
60. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13
(2010).
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Writing for a conservative majority that notably included Justice
Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts declined to read the material support
statute so as to require proof that a defendant specifically intended to aid
the illegal activities of an FTO.61 The knowledge specified in the
(amended) statute was at once broader and narrower than this, requiring
only that the defendant know he was providing material support to a
designated organization or a group engaged in terrorist activity. That
reading then forced a decision on whether the statute as written could
62
withstand First Amendment free speech and free association scrutiny.
Roberts rejected the government's argument that, since the material
support statute reached only conduct and not speech, it was subject to
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. Though the statute did not reach
the uncoordinated advocacy of a designated organization, it did prohibit
a person's attempt to communicate directly with the FTO even for the
purpose of trying to persuade that organization to adopt peaceful, lawful
methods of conduct (the kind of speech in which the Humanitarian Law
Project said it wanted to engage).63 Indeed, as then-Solicitor General
Kagan had asserted in the oral argument before the Supreme Court, the
material support statute did not even permit a lawyer simply to file an
amicus brief on behalf of an FTO in federal court-which is as good a
64
clue as any that something is amiss in this area of the law.
The Court noted that despite imposing a content-based restriction
on speech, the statute satisfied the narrowly tailored prong of strict
scrutiny analysis on three related grounds: the fungibility of money,
legitimacy concerns, and foreign policy concerns. The fungibility of
money permits a designated organization to use money given for
peaceful ends towards a terrorist objective, or simply to free up other
funds that can be used to support terrorism. Coordinated political
advocacy on behalf of an FTO, for its part, could facilitate the work of
terrorism by raising the profile of the organization internationally and
drawing additional support in the form of new recruits and funds. And
61. Id. at 2717-18.
62. Id. at 2718.
63. Id. at 2723-24.
64. Only an entirely uncoordinated brief would, per the Solicitor General's
argument, escape the reach of the statute. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-49, 53,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2706 (2010)
(No. 08-1498), 2010 WL 621318.
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the provision of material support to an FTO risked interfering with the
United States' relationship to allied nations who are cooperating in the
fight against terrorism. As to each of these three rationales, the Court
concluded that it was not in a position to second-guess the factual
findings and judgment of Congress.65
Justice Breyer, writing for himself as well as Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor, dissented. Breyer agreed with Roberts that the
government had identified a compelling interest in the need to deny
terrorist organizations access to financial and other fungible resources,
but he disagreed that even the problem of international terrorism "can
require automatic forfeiture of First Amendment rights."66 It was not
obvious, said Breyer, that helping the PKK and LTTE to petition the
United Nations for peaceful political change could be exchanged into
resources used for more sinister ends. As used in the majority's opinion,
the fungibility and legitimacy concepts extended beyond even what
Congress and the Solicitor General had advanced, creating a risk that too
much clearly protected political speech would be subject to criminal
penalties. Additionally, the mere coordination of protected speech with a
designated organization was itself insufficient to deprive the plaintiffs of
67
First Amendment protection.
From a case involving a secular humanitarian organization
seeking to engage in purely political and peaceful interactions with
designated secular entities, the fungibility doctrine has become applied to
the context of religious charitable giving, where a wider range of First
Amendment claims is, at least theoretically, in play. The Humanitarian
Law Project decision, in its various incarnations, has weaved its way
over the course of the Terror Decade through both civil and criminal
cases involving designated, U.S.-based Muslim charities. Only three such
criminal cases have been brought: the Islamic American Relief Agency
65. Holder, 561 U.S. at _,130 S. Ct. at 2724-25, 2728-29, 2731.
66. Id. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2731-38. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer agreed with the majority
that the terms "expert advice or assistance," "training," and "service" as used in the
material support statute were not unconstitutionally vague. For contrasting
perspectives on the Roberts-Breyer debate, compare Robert Chesney, The Supreme
Court, Material Support, and the Lasting Impact of Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, I WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2011) (defending the majority
opinion), with Wadie Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court's
Construction of Terrorism, 5 BYU L. REV. 1455 (2011) (agreeing with the dissent).
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(IARA, based in Missouri), HLF, and BIF. Only HLF has faced an actual
material support of terrorism charge. IARA was prosecuted for
violating the IEEPA and U.S. sanctions regulations by transferring funds
into Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein,69 and BIF for making and
using false declarations.70 To date, only one Muslim American charity
has been convicted of material support of terrorism (HLF);71 IARA
72closed down before it could be brought to trial, and the charges against
BIF were dismissed by a federal district judge.73 There have, however,
been several individual convictions in these cases, including of Mark
Siljander, a Michigan Republican who served in Congress from 1981 to
1987, and who pleaded guilty to falsely telling investigators that money
he had received from IARA was in support of a book he was writing
about Christian-Islamic relations.74 The former head of BIF, former
officials of the Al Haramain Foundation in Ashland, Oregon, and former
officials of the Boston-based charity Care International have been
convicted on fraud and false statement charges rather than material
75support of terrorism.
Exactly what this record tells us about the involvement of
Muslim American charities in the funding of terrorist organizations
overseas is a complicated matter. Views on every range of the spectrum
can be found, from the assumption that virtually the entire sector is
68. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 33.
69. U.S. Muslim Charities and the War on Terror: A Decade in Review,
CHARITY & SECURITY NETWORK (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.
charityandsecurity.org/system/files/USMuslimCharitiesAndTheWarOnTerror.pdf.
70. U.S. v. Benevolence Int'l Found., No. 02-CR-414, 2002 WL 31050156, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2002).
71. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.
2008).
72. U.S. Charity Shut Down By Treasury: Islamic American Relief Agency
(JARA-USA), CHARITY & SECURITY NETWORK (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www
.charityandsecurity.org/background/shutdown IARAUSA.
73. Benevolence Int 7 Found., 2002 WL 31050156, at *8.
74. See R. Jeffery Smith, Siljander Pleads Guilty in Islamic American Relief
Agency Lobbying Case, WASH. POST (July 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/07/AR2010070705205.html.
75. The most up-to-date tracking of these cases is done by the Charity and
Security Network. See Litigation Overview, CHARITY AND SECURITY NETWORK
(Apr.12, 2012), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/resources?type=
litigation&tid=All.
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implicated in criminal activity to the nearly opposite assertion that most
are innocent of any criminal conduct. Exemplars of the former view
include Rachel Ehrenfeld, author of a proposal to ban Muslim charity in
the United States;76 Steven Emerson, author of the books Jihad
Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US. and American Jihad:
The Terrorist Living Among Us, (their ominous titles evoking a fifth
column of Muslim Americans hiding away in sleeper cells funded by co-
religionist charities) 77 and J. Millard Burr and Robert 0. Collins, authors
of a scholarly volume entitled Alms for Jihad, which argues that
"Muslims alone are susceptible to the lure of Islamist extremism" and
that unspecified "steps must be taken to diminish their unique
susceptibility to this totalitarian ideology."78 These themes are echoed in
the work of Jay Sekulow and David Yerushalmi, attorneys who have
been actively involved in litigation seeking to contain what they regard
as reactionary Islamic influences in the United States across a range of
fronts.79 Not all of these individuals are as extreme as some of their
76. RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL: How TERRORISM is FINANCED - AND
How TO STOP IT 21-22 (2005). For this writer's proposal to ban Muslim charity, see
Rachel Ehrenfeld & Alyssa A. Lappen, Op-Ed., Jihadists and Jews, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2006, at A21. Ehrenfeld has taken up the First Amendment banner in
defending herself against libel tourist suits in British courts by a Saudi Arabian
citizen and former banker, seeking damages in connection with Ehrenfeld's
accusations that he had financed terrorism. See EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL, at xi.
77. STEVEN EMERSON, JIHAD INCORPORATED: A GUIDE TO MILITANT ISLAM
(2006); STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICAN JIHAD: THE TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG US
(2002).
78. J. MILLARD BURR & ROBERT 0. COLLINs, ALMS FOR JIHAD: CHARITY AND
TERRORISM IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 286 (2006). The language in question here is
drawn verbatim (with attribution but without quotation marks) from Daniel Pipes,
Protecting Muslims while Rooting out Islamists, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) (Sept.
14, 2001.), available at http://www.danielpipes.org/66/protecting-muslims-while-
rooting-out-islamists. The Burr/Collins volume was withdrawn from publication
after the publisher, threatened with a libel lawsuit by the same Saudi businessman
who sued Ehrenfeld, determined that it contained false accusations about that
individual's alleged financing of terrorism.
79. JAY ALAN SEKULOW ET AL., SHARIAH IN AMERICA 5-15 (2011). Sekulow's
path to becoming one of the country's most well-known religious liberty litigators is
traced in JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 88-98, 125-26 (2007). On Yerushalmi, see Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind
the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all. See also
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rhetoric may suggest. Sekulow, for example, who is a noted religious
liberty advocate, clarifies that his purpose "is not to say that Muslims are
not welcome in the United States; they are.' And Ehrenfeld
acknowledges that the various Muslim charities she describes do pursue
worthy causes, such as the building of hospitals and supplying of food, in
addition to their alleged illicit activities.
By contrast, scholars such as Ibrahim Warde, Akbar Ahmed, and
Jonathan Benthall, as well as advocacy groups like the ACLU, paint a
more benign and sympathetic view of the Muslim American charitable
82
sector. These sources do not deny that there have been problems of
management and misuse of funds in a sector that has traditionally
operated according to very informal and even lackadaisical governance
83standards. But they insist that the blanket attribution of criminality to
the sector, in part or in whole, is based on tenuous evidence purporting a
link between Muslim charities and terrorism, and it creates the mistaken
impression that the war on terror is a war against Islam.84 Moreover, they
generally suggest (albeit somewhat inconsistently) that the government's
crackdown is also counter-productive in national security terms, since it
has served to drive monies that could otherwise be regulated into the
underground terrorist economy. Finally, they argue that the financial
war on terror has served to "chill" legitimate charitable giving "[a]t a
time when poverty, hopelessness, and despair are widely acknowledged
as factors in breeding terror and sustaining terror networks." 86
The Muslim Brotherhood in America, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY (Aug. 24,
2013), http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-america/
(website of Yerushalmi's collaborator Frank Gaffney, head of the Center for
Security Policy in Washington, D.C.).
80. SEKULOw Et Al., supra note 79, at 7.
81. EHRENFELD, supra note 76, at 22.
82. WARDE, supra note 26, at 127-50; AHMED, supra note 8, at 149-52;
Jonathan Benthall, Islamic Humanitarianism in Adversarial Context, in FORCES OF
COMPASSION: HUMANITARIANISM BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 99-121 (Erica
Bornstein & Peter Redfield eds., 2010); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra
note 11.
83. WARDE, supra note 26, at 128, 147; Benthall, supra note 82, at 115-17.
84. WARDE, supra note 26, at 139, 147; Benthall, supra note 82, at 111.
85. WARDE, supra note 26, at 147, 150; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
supra note 11, at 122-24.
86. WARDE, supra note 26, at 149; see also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, supra note 11, at 89-109.
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It is no simple matter to understand just how the interests of
donors and recipients of Muslim charitable activity have been affected by
the prosecutions of the Terror Decade. By nearly all accounts, the
crackdown on Muslim American charities did cause a significant drop in
charitable giving and expenditures in the years after 9/11.8 More
recently, during the period from 2005 or 2006 to the present, there have
been indications of a significant rebound that suggest the earlier drop
has, over time, been counterbalanced by correspondingly greater
amounts of giving to the handful of Muslim American charities that have
88survived the post-9/11 era unscathed, such as Islamic Relief USA. But
the fate of the operational side of Muslim charitable activity remains
uncertain. This appears to be due to ongoing restrictions on the ability of
religious and secular organizations to deliver humanitarian aid to conflict
zones, and the reluctance of banks and other financial institutions to
work with Muslim charities for fear of sanctions in the event that money
laundering or terrorism financing charges are brought.89
87. See Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Muslims Temper Ramadan Giving with
Caution, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004
/nov/06/local/me-beliefs6/2; Zahra N. Jamal, Charitable Giving Among Muslim
Americans: Ten Years After 9/11, INSTITUTY FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND
UNDERSTANDING, at 9 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.ispu.org/pdfs
/ISPUPolicy/o20Brief JamalWEB.pdf; DONOHUE, supra note 52, at 168; Erich
Ferrari, Deep Freeze: Islamic Charities and the Financial War on Terror, 7
SCHOLAR 205, 206 (2005); Neil MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving by
U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/3
0/us/30CHARITY.html?pagewanted=1& _r-2&fta=y.
88. See Sally Howell, (Re)Bounding Islamic Charitable Giving in the Terror
Decade, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 35 (2010-2011); ADIL NAJAM,
PORTRAIT OF A GIVING COMMUNITY: PHILANTHROPY BY THE PAKISTANI-AMERICAN
DIASPORA 6, 134 (2006); Stephanie Strom, A.C.L.U. Report Says Antiterror Fight
Undercuts Liberty of Muslim Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A14, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/us/16charity.html?_r-0. Especially cautious
donors seem to select those charities that have been approved by the Better Business
Bureau and the Charity Navigator. Muslim Advocates, a 501(c)(3) based in San
Francisco, has a widely respected accreditation program used by many Muslim
American donors, mosques, and charitable organizations.
89. See Naz K. Modirzadeh, Dustin A. Lewis & Claude Bruderlein,
Humanitarian Engagement Under Counter-Terrorism: A Conflict of Norms and the
Emerging Policy Landscape, 93 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 883 (2011); Overseas
Development Institute, Humanitarian Action and the 'Global War on Terror': A
Review of Trends and Issue, in HUMANITARIAN POLICY GROUP REPORT 14 (Joanna
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Falling somewhere in between these denunciatory and
sympathetic poles are the 9/11 Commission Report and its accompanying
staff report on terrorist financing. The Commission was not able to trace
the provenance of the funds that supported the 9/11 perpetrators. But it
found, based on interviews with intelligence sources, that Al Qaeda
regularly collected money from the employees of corrupt Islamic
charities located in Saudi Arabia, particularly the Saudi-based Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation.90 The Commission Staff's "Monograph
on Terrorist Financing" recapped the intelligence community's findings
against Al Haramain, but declined to arrive at any final conclusions on
its status, noting that U.S.-Saudi collaboration had resulted in the
freezing of the charity's assets and its eventual dissolution by the Saudi
government.9 1 The Staff Monograph provided a complex account of the
government's investigations of the U.S-based charities BIF and GRF. On
the one hand, it said, the "aggressive" nature of those investigations
"raises substantial civil liberty concerns" and highlights "the difference
between seeing links to terrorists and proving funding of terrorists, and
the problem of defining the threshold of information necessary to take
disruptive action." 9 2 And it noted that these investigations "revealed little
compelling evidence that either of these charities actually provided
financial support to Al Qaeda.' 93 On the other hand, the Commission
Staff found that "BIF, at least, was plainly funding armed jihadist
Macrae & Adele Harmer eds., July 2003); Elizabeth A. Bloodgood & Joannie
Tremblay-Boire, Counterterrorism and Civil Society, 12 INT'L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
L. 4 (2010), available at http://www.icnl.org/research/joumal/voll2iss4
/special 1.htm.
90. 9/11 COMMIsSION REPORT, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 169-71 (2004). See also the careful analysis of
Jon B. Alterman, Saudi Charities and Support for Terror, in UNDERSTANDING
ISLAMIC CHARITIES 64-80 (Jon B. Alterman & Karin von Hippel eds., 2007).
91. JOHN ROTH ET AL., "MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING": STAFF
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES 12 (Aug. 21, 2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/9 1/staff
statements/9 1 TerrFinMonograph.pdf.
92. Id. at 111-12.
93. Id. at 111.
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fighters" and that, with respect to both charities, "the evidence of their
links to terrorists and jihadists is significant."94
For what it is worth, my own views on this issue most closely
resemble those reflected in the Staff Monograph. But at least some of the
documents that could help to better evaluate these contrasting
perspectives are unavailable due to the rules governing challenges to the
designation of terrorist organizations and seizures of their assets. The
most important such rule is that the federal government can act first and
justify later: no prior hearing or notice is required for a designation or
asset freeze. Thus, the institution is effectively closed down before the
opportunity to investigate or challenge the designation can arise.9 5 For
charities that have the financial resources to persist, challenges are
handled in one of two ways depending on the type of designation.
Neither the IEEPA nor E.O. 13,224 provides for judicial review of the
designation of SDGTs by OFAC.96 Muslim American charities and other
parties have nonetheless sought relief by recourse to the general
provisions for review of agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Thus, an OFAC designation can be set aside as
unlawful only if the reviewing court determines that it was made in an
"arbitrary and capricious" manner; the standard of review that is applied
to that standard is itself highly deferential. Moreover, since the courts
permit the government to come forth with classified evidence ex parte
and in camera, there has been little way for the challenging party to
.98
prove arbitrariness or caprice.
94. Id. at 111-12. The ACLU report BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY,
supra note 11, at 10-11, quotes somewhat selectively from these portions of the
Staff Monograph.
95. See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 87, at 213-14.
96. Id. at 211-13 ("[IEEPA] discretion is left solely up to the Executive
branch") (explaining that E.O. 13,244 gave the Secretary of State all power granted
to the President by IEEPA, but did not add judicial review).
97. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237.
98. Both Treasury and State have the authority to revoke a designated
organization's terrorist status, though this has happened in an exceedingly rare
number of cases. The only instance of which I am aware is OFAC's recent
revocation of its designation of KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian
Development, a Muslim American charity based in Toledo, Ohio. See Erica Blake,
Charity Taken Off Suspected Terrorist List: Feds Settle Suit, Agree to Pay Ex-Toledo
Group's Legal Fees, TOLEDO BLADE (May 2, 2012), http://www.toledoblade.com
/local/2012/05/02/Charity-taken-off-suspected-terrorist-list-1 .html.
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For FTOs designated by the Secretary of State, by contrast, a
specific statutory scheme applies. Designated organizations must bring
their challenge directly to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
which may consider, again exparte and in camera, classified information
used by the State Department in making the designation. The scope of
review tracks general APA standards. 99 In material support criminal
cases, claims about the underlying FTO designation are barred
altogether. 100
Despite, or perhaps because of, these rather one-sided rules,
some courts have found due process and Fourth, Fifth, and even Sixth
Amendment violations in Muslim charity cases.'0o But the difficulty of
identifying a workable remedy has limited the significance of these
holdings.10 2 By contrast, a 2012 European Court of Justice decision
finding due process violations in the European Union's asset freezing
and designation procedures resulted in a United Nations-led effort to
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3) (2004). The D.C. Circuit thus can set aside a
designation if it finds that designation to be "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right; (D) lacking substantial support in
the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to
the court . . .; (E) not in accord with the procedures required by law."
100. 8 U.S.C. § 11 89(a)(8) (2004).
101. See Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 686 F.3d
965, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding an unreasonable seizure when the Treasury
Department froze the entity's assets without ever obtaining a warrant, and remanding
to trial court for a remedy); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v.
Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (finding that Treasury acted
"arbitrarily and capriciously" by preventing charity from accessing its own funds to
pay counsel for its defense, finding Fourth and Fifth amendment violations where
Treasury failed to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before blocking assets,
and finding that Treasury failed to provide entity with adequate notice and
meaningful opportunity to respond, but permitting government to show post hoc
probable cause for its actions).
102. This is in part because the damage is already done by the time an
organization is actually designated as terrorist or its assets frozen. In the Al
Haramain case, the Ninth Circuit held that Treasury's violation of the plaintiffs' due
process rights by failing to provide constitutionally adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to respond prior to designation would not have changed the
outcome of the designation process, given that substantial evidence supported the
organization's redesignation. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 1001.
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reform international counterterrorism financing policy.'o3 And the
relative success of procedural claims has effectively occupied the space
that a more vigorous contest over First Amendment arguments might
have taken. A somewhat symbolic example can be found in the case of
the Ohio-based KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development.
In 2008, Kindhearts brought a civil challenge to an OFAC order blocking
its assets pending investigation issued two and a half years before. A
federal district court held that a protective order limiting the charity's
and counsel's access to discovery imposed an unjustified burden on the
charity's due process and Sixth Amendment rights to fair and adequate
representation by counsel.10 4 In the course of its decision, the court noted
that while "adverse First Amendment consequences result from
[Kindhearts'] inability to have access to copies of their materials . . .
those consequences are of lesser importance.' 0o This state of affairs
speaks to a broader and distinctively American phenomenon, namely, the
twentieth-century proceduralization of criminal justice, which substitutes
for judgments about the substantive limits of the government's powers,
including its power to investigate and punish religiously motivated
conduct by means of neutral and generally applicable laws.'os
B. The Theology and Jurisprudence of Zakat
The religious tradition with which material support law has
collided begins with a Qur'anic verse defining the Muslim institution of
103. See Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
Council of the European Union and the United Kingdom, Joined Cases C-402/05 P
and C-415/05 P (European Court of Justice, September 3, 2008); Tackling the
Financing of Terrorism, CTITF WORKING GROUP REPORT (United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force), Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf financingengfinal.pdf.
Implementation of sanctions against Al-Qaida is managed at the U.N. level by a
committee known as the 1267 Committee. Thanks to Steve Ratner for alerting me to
this information.
104. In re Search of Kind Hearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 594 F.
Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
105. Id. at 860-61.
106. See WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
74-85 (2011) (contrasting the proceduralism emphasis of the American Bill of
Rights with the substantive limits on governmental power in the 1789 French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen).
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charitable giving. That verse, known as "ayat al sadaka," or the sadaka
verse, reads as follows:
Alms are for the poor And the needy, and those
Employed to administer the (funds); For those
whose hearts Have been (recently) reconciled (To
Truth); for those in bondage And in debt; in the
cause Of Allah; and for the wayfarer. (Thus is it)
ordained by Allah, And Allah is full of knowledge
And wisdom.107
Zakat is "the obligatory payment by Muslims of a determinate
portion of specified categories of their lawful property for the benefit of
the poor and other enumerated classes" in accordance with this Qur'anic
verse.108 The word zakat means purification and is derived from the verb
zaka, which means "to thrive," "to be wholesome," "to be pure." 109 As
one of the five pillars constituting the minimum conduct required of all
Muslims, zakat is to be distinguished from sadaka, which refers to alms
voluntarily given (although the term sadaka is often used for zakat, as in
the verse just cited). 110
At issue in some (but not all) of the post-9/ 11 controversies over
Muslim charitable giving is the category of recipients who are "in (or
for) the cause of God," also translated as "in God's way," or "in the path
of God.""' According to the Islamic legal historian Aron Zysow:
107. THE HOLY QUR'AN 9:60 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans. 1st ed. 1989).
108. Aron Zysow, Zakat, in 11 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 406 (new ed.,
2005).
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also OMER FARUK SENTORK, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
ZARAT: CHARITY IN ISLAM 3-5, 109-28 (2007); JONATHAN BENTHALL & JEROME
BELLION-JOURDAN, THE CHARITABLE CRESCENT: POLITICS OF AID IN THE MUSLIM
WORLD 9-12 (2003).
111. For the "in God's way" translation, see THE KORAN INTERPRETED 186
(Arthur J. Arberry trans., 1982). 1 use the Ali translation because it seems to be
favored by English-speaking Muslims throughout the world and is the dominant text
adopted by Muslim Americans. But it is also worth noting that the term Ali
translates as "alms" is translated by others as "the freewill offerings" or "voluntary
alms" (in other words, the technical meaning of the term sadaka rather than zakat).
In addition to the Arberry translation, see THE QUR'AN 151 (Tarif Khalidi trans.,
2008).
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The most common interpretation is that these are
the volunteers engaged in djihad. They are to be
given zakat to meet their living expenses and the
expenses of their military service (animals,
weapons). The Twelvers [that is, Shiite Muslims
who acknowledge the authority of a line of twelve
infallible leaders (imams) beginning with the
Prophet Muhammad's cousin Ali] came to adopt a
broader interpretation that encompasses a range of
public services, including the repair of mosques
and bridges . . . . The Hanafis [one of the four
schools of Sunni Islamic law], among others,
rejected the use of zakat for such purposes on the
ground that the valid payment of zakat requires a
transfer of ownership from one person to
another.112
The literature on the definition ofjihad in Islamic history is vast,
contentious, and far beyond the scope of this essay to resolve. 113 I cite
these two extended quotations-the sadaka verse and Zysow's
commentary on the meaning of the phrase "in the cause of God"-in
order to make two simple points.
First, zakat involves the transfer of money from one person to
another. On both the giving and receiving ends, the persons can be
corporate persons, institutions-as in a mosque or a charitable trust
(waqf) or organization. But ultimately the purpose of zakat is to ensure
that money gets from the hands of people who have it to those who need
it, where need is defined according to the categories of the sadaqa verse
and other Qur'anic verses on charity, the sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad, and the rules of Islamic law (sharia) based upon those
verses and sayings. This is, in other words, a fundamentally relational
form of religious exercise, and any understanding of constitutional right
that can be said to attach to that should recognize this difference from the
classic liberal-individualist conception of rights.
112. Zysow, supra note 108, at 416.
113. See, e.g., MICHAEL BONNER, JIHAD IN ISLAMIC HISTORY: DOCTRINES AND
PRACTICE (2006); DAVID COOK, UNDERSTANDING JIHAD (2005).
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It is also a relational practice that continues to change over time
and place. As Ibrahim Warde has explained, in recent years Muslim
understandings of the proper recipients of charitable giving have evolved
to include refugees, prisoners and their dependents, and the so-called
dawa effort, which entails proselytization among non-Muslims and
deepening the faith of Muslims.114 In light of these overlapping groups, it
is not surprising that Muslim charities, whether U.S. or foreign-based,
have tended to focus on places such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia,
Chechnya, and Israel/Palestine.i 5 Even with this adaptation of Muslim
charity to the situation of the modem world, the religious command of
zakat retains a strongly moralistic bent. As the Turkish theologian Omer
Faruk Sentiirk has written, "zakat can be defined as the right possessed
by the poor in the wealth of the rich, a right sternly ordained by God, the
true owner of riches and property."ll 6
Second, the institution of zakat is intimately bound up with
questions of scriptural and exegetical meaning in Islamic law. As
Zysow's commentary suggests, those questions have been contested,
generating what were relatively minor differences of opinion between the
traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence, but what are now rather
fundamental conflicts between progressive and conservative Muslims,
particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. Treatises on the law of zakat can
run into the hundreds of pages. And the matters in question implicate a
range of conduct far greater than is generally associated with the
institution of charity in other religions. For example, zakat historically
played an important role in the freeing of slaves and the relief of debtors
under Islamic jurisdictions.117 But the practice of zakat nonetheless
remains emphatically religious in nature, "a cornerstone of the
acceptance of the Islamic faith,"' 8 the essence of what binds one Muslim
to another and both to God.
Thus, any American legal doctrine that purports to regulate the
transfer of money either at home or abroad is, in theory, capable of
reaching the institution of zakat. Since at least 1977, and now with far
114. WARDE, supra note 26, at 146. This is in addition to rather than in lieu of
the traditional Qur'anic categories of needy and deprived individuals.
115. Id.
116. SENTORK, supra note 110, at x.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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greater force since 9/11 under the fungibility logic of Humanitarian Law
Project, American national security law has permitted far-reaching
executive action to regulate money transfers that cross over national
boundaries. And the nature of Muslim American charity is such that it is
typically extended to other Muslims abroad, usually needy co-religionists
residing in conflict zones.
C. The Varieties of Religious Liberty Claims
Muslim Americans have in recent years appealed to the full array
of claims recognized by the law of religious liberty. In contexts outside
of the Muslim charity controversy, they have sometimes invoked the law
of church autonomy, which generally prohibits courts from deciding
questions of internal institutional leadership and religious doctrine.m
The pervasiveness of theological and doctrinal considerations in the
practice of zakat suggests that government regulation of charitable giving
can brush up against the American law of church autonomy as well as
free exercise. Since these are questions of religious doctrine, and since
Muslim charities are properly considered religious institutions by and
large, it stands to reason that, in principle at least, religious institutional
autonomy is relevant to thinking about the consequences of the financial
war on terror. I consider the relationship between church autonomy and
the crackdown on Muslim charity in Part III of this Article.
Muslim American prisoner litigation challenging burdens on the
free exercise of religion-a tradition commenced in the 1950s by
African-American inmates adhering to the Nation of Islam, who forced
the federal courts to bring the prisons under the protection of the
Constitution for the first time 20--has been a steady presence on the
federal court dockets, now under the aegis of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000.121 And there have been
119. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010);
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); Mansour v. Islamic
Educ. Ctr. of Tampa, Inc., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct., Mar. 22, 2011).
120. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 96-132.
121. Prisoner cases make up the vast majority of the religious liberty cases
statistically analyzed in the 2011 Sisk and Heise study. See Sisk and Heise, supra
note 6, at 53. These cases are regularly collected and briefed on Professor Howard
Friedman's Religion Clause blog: www.religionclause.blogspot.com. A recent
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numerous challenges (several of them successful) under the RLUIPA
statute to local zoning decisions that allegedly discriminate against
mosques and Islamic community centers.122 Muslims have also brought
anti-discrimination and free exercise challenges to restrictions on their
ability to wear religious headwear and adhere to other rules of personal
comportment.123
Richard Schragger has recently argued that free exercise has
been and will continue to be in for a hard time in the post-9/11 era.124 He
emphasizes the relationship between Employment Division v. Smithl25
and public anxieties about another major terrorist attack. In Smith, the
Court held that a member of a Native American church who wished to
ingest peyote as part of a religious ceremony could not assert a free
exercise challenge against a neutral and generally applicable law that
example is Wesley v. City of New York, No. 05-Civ-5833, 2012 WL 3262749, at *1,
4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) (rejecting a Muslim inmate's claim that the washing of
halal food trays together with non-halal trays violated his right to the provision of
halal food). See also Ahmad v. Dep't of Corr., 845 N.E.2d 289 (Mass. 2006)
(rejecting Muslim prisoner's claims of right to prayer rug and halal diet).
122. See Eric Treene, RLUIPA and Mosques: Enforcing a Fundamental Right
in Challenging Times, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 330 (2012). Conversely, it is surely
a sign of something like progress and integration that a Muslim charter school and a
Muslim American charity have, since 9/11, found themselves on the other side of an
ACLU lawsuit alleging that the defendants were using tax funds to establish a school
promoting Islam in violation of the establishment clause. See ACLU of Minn. v.
Tarek lbn Zayed Acad., 788 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Minn. 2011) (denying defendants'
motion for summary judgment because reasonable juror could find the principal
primary effect of the school's creation was to advance the religion of Islam). For an
example of a pre-9/11 establishment clause challenge brought by a Muslim
American party, see Mehdi v. U.S, Postal Serv., 988 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that post office display of Christmas and Hanukah but not Muslim symbols
did not violate the establishment clause).
123. See Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding
that a Muslim police officer's request to wear a headscarf with her uniform could be
reasonably accommodated without imposing an undue burden upon police
department). See also United States v. Amina Farah Ali, No. 11-3512 (8th Cir. June
4, 2012) (holding that a defendant convicted of material support of terrorism could
bring a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to a judge's finding of
contempt when she failed to stand when the court convened and recessed).
124. Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise after Employment
Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, the "War on Terror," and Religious
Freedom, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 2009 (2011).
125. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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burdened that practice.126 To be successful on free exercise grounds, the
plaintiff in such cases would have to show that the law in question
specifically targeted religious exercise. 12 Schragger's claim, in essence,
is that 9/11 has reinforced the authority of Smith: the religious tensions of
the Terror Decade and widespread concerns that Islam does not share
certain core American values are likely to curb any effort to loosen
Smith's tight grip on the constitutional law of free exercise.128 But he also
identifies a countervailing force at work, in the form of the gay and
lesbian civil rights struggle, which is putting pressure on Smith in the
name of relieving religious groups from the obligations of (neutral and
generally applicable) anti-discrimination laws.129
So far as 9/11 and Muslim America are concerned, the relevant
pressures do seem to be working in favor of maintaining the free exercise
status quo.130 Smith has been a factor in the story of what has happened
to Muslim American religious liberty during the Terror Decade. While
this Article has noted the absence of any major federal court
pronouncements on religious liberty in the context of the war on terror,
the larger truth may simply be that, in the years since Smith, there have
been few such pronouncements in any context, pre- or post-9/1 1. The
biggest exceptions are Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah 13  and Hosanna-Tabor v. Lutheran Evangelical Church &
School v. EEOC,132 but both are, at least according to the Court, easily
distinguished from Smith-the former because it involved a set of local
ordinances that unmistakably and specifically targeted the animal
sacrifice practices of the Afro-Caribbean religion of Santeria,133 the latter
because it involves an "internal" church decision about who is qualified
to minister to the faithful.1 34
126. Id. at 878-86.
127. Id. at 878. Smith was a civil rather than a criminal case, even though the
drug use for which Smith was fired could have subjected him to criminal charges. Id
at 882-83.
128. Schragger, supra note 124, at 2028-30.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2010-13, 2029.
131. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
132. 565 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
133. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 562-63.
134. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 697.
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Another, somewhat more abstract way of putting this point
would be to say, as Douglas Laycock has, that the Supreme Court no
longer recognizes a "bare" right to the free exercise of religion, in
contrast to the church autonomy and conscientious objection lines of
cases, which have both survived Smith. According to Laycock, "the
Court has taken the bare right to engage in religious activities and made
it a conscientious objection claim, even as it greatly reduced the scope of
constitutional protection for conscientious objection claims," through the
rule that neutral and generally applicable laws cannot be challenged in
free exercise terms. This rather stark description of the anatomy of our
current free exercise law seems not entirely right. Lukumi Babalu, for
one, seems to involve a "bare" right to engage in religious activities just
as much as (if not more than) a claim of conscientious objection, for in
that latter context the government typically seeks to force the objecting
party to engage in conduct that it claims it cannot undertake for reasons
of conscience.136 But the more limited thesis-that free exercise as a
right to engage in religious activities has a greatly reduced scope after
Smith-seems right.
The combination of Smith and 9/11 has certainly had some
impact on judicial understandings of free exercise. But trying to figure
out exactly what this impact is turns out, here too, to be difficult to
accomplish in practice. Schragger concedes that "[w]e have not yet seen
the reaction to 9/11 show up directly in the law of free exercise. 137 But,
he insists, "it is just a matter of time before the politics of 9/11 comes to
the doctrinal fore in the Religion Clauses." 38 The Muslim charity
cases-to the extent they rely on religious liberty holdings consisting of
the summary statement that "there is no free exercise right to fund
135. 2 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
309 (2010).
136. In Lukumi Babalu, South Floridian followers of the Afro-Cuban religion
known as Santeria sought First Amendment protection for the practice of animal
sacrifice in birth, marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, and other
purposes. 508 U.S. at 525. A leading example of the conscientious objection line of
cases is United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (involving a claim of
conscientious objection to combatant training and service).
137. Schragger, supra note 124, at 2014.
138. Id.
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terrorists" 9-seem at first glance entirely consistent with this emphasis
on the relationship between Smith and 9/11.
A sustained reading of the material support of terrorism
jurisprudence, however, indicates that there may be less to that
relationship than meets the eye. Arguably, Smith and the constitutional
law of free exercise have had very little to do with the actual outcomes of
these cases. This is so for two reasons, one obvious, another less so. The
obvious reason is that, since the Muslim charity cases involve federal law
enforcement, the applicable standard is not Smith but the 1993 Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restores the pre-Smith,
compelling state interest standard in any case, civil or criminal, where
"free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 4 0 But this
distinction does not amount to much of a difference because even RFRA
claims have been uniformly rejected in the federal courts that have
presided over these cases. It is, indeed, on the basis of RFRA law that the
courts have stated "there is no free exercise right to fund terrorists."l 4 1
There is reason to question whether RFRA has had much of an
impact on the disposition of religious liberty cases at all: one study of
reported decisions from the period between the enactment of RFRA and
its invalidation as to the states in City of Boerne finds that RFRA
claimants prevailed in only fifteen percent of the cases. 14 Since a
successful RFRA claim requires a court to find that the government's
chosen means towards the accomplishment of a compelling interest are
not narrowly tailored,143 Smith (with its direction to judges that they
avoid such analyses) may well be operating in the background of these
139. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1993). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down RFRA's application to the states as
exceeding Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. RFRA remains applicable to the federal government. Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). In only one of
the Muslim charity cases is Smith even cited in passing, see Holy Land Found., 333
F.3d at 166, and there merely for the purpose of explaining the background to
RFRA.
141. Holy Land Found, 333 F.3d at 167.
142. Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 591
(1998).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b)(2), 2000bb(c) (1993).
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decisions. In other words, RFRA may simply be permitting courts in
Muslim charity and other cases to go through the motions of the pre-
Smith free exercise standard, all while reconfirming the irrelevance of
disparate impact arguments to First Amendment law (and religious
liberty law specifically) after Smith and RFRA as before.
Hostility to disparate impact theories in both First and
Fourteenth Amendment law means that there has been no real judicial
forum for addressing the interests of donors and recipients of Muslim
American charity, as opposed to the charitable institutions and their
officers who have nearly always been the parties in these cases.14 5 A
related obstacle has been that free exercise law, unlike free speech law,
does not recognize claims based on a chilling effect; the litigant must
show not simply that state action has the incidental effect of over-
deterring protected religious exercise, but imposes a direct burden on his
.146
or her own free exercise.
In any event, as we will see, the Muslim charity controversy
requires another account of what has happened to religious freedom
claims in the Terror Decade, one that does not rely on either the
constitutional or the statutory law of free exercise per se.
II. FREE EXERCISE, FREE SPEECH, AND FUNGIBILITY
Fungibility, an offshoot of the constitutional law of
counterterrorism, does the work that Smith might otherwise have done in
the war on terror, and it is key to explaining the fate of religious liberty
claims in the Muslim charity litigation. Religious liberty arguments in
these cases are treated, not without reason, as variations on free speech
(or, to a lesser extent, free association) theories. In nearly all contexts
involving a designated organization, fungibility makes both the religious
and the secular First Amendment claim essentially futile. The story
144. The pre-Smith standard was based on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
145. On the First Amendment's lack of receptivity to disparate impact theory,
see William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society, and Speech-Based Claims
for Religious Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1937, 1946 (2011) ("[T]he First Amendment does not protect against
disparate impacts.").
146. Id.
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begins with the earliest lower court articulations of the fungibility
standard in the post-9/1 1 era.
A. "There is No Free Exercise Right to Fund Terrorists"
Narrow or pyrrhic victories are typical of the lower court cases
that have reached the merits of a charity's First Amendment claim. In
2002, the D.C. Circuit, reviewing a district court's dismissal of HLF's
lawsuit challenging its designation as an SDT and SDGT, found that the
district court had failed to apply the 12(b)(6) standard that requires
treating the complainant's allegations as true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss. HLF's complaint, unsurprisingly, alleged that it did not support
terrorism and asserted that OFAC's designation violated the First and
Fifth Amendments as well as RFRA. The district court had rejected these
claims on the grounds that "there is no constitutional right to facilitate
terrorism." 1 4 7 In order to arrive at such a finding, Judge Sentelle said for
the D.C. Circuit, the district court would have had to find, as a factual
predicate, that HLF actually facilitated terrorism in some way, which it
was not permitted to do under the 12(b)(6) standard.148
Having gone through these motions, the appellate panel then
held that HLF had suffered no prejudice as a result of the district court's
abuse of discretion because the result would have been identical at the
summary judgment stage. In other words, HLF would have suffered
prejudice only if it could have produced evidence upon which a
reasonable trier of fact could have found that the designation violated the
First or Fifth Amendments or RFRA. And this it could not do because
(indeed) "there is no constitutional right to fund terrorism. The ample
record evidence (particularly taking into account the classified
information presented to the court in camera) establishing HLF's role in
the funding of Hamas and of its terrorist activities is incontrovertible."1 4 9
Several years later, as we will see, HLF would have the opportunity to
confront this evidence head-on in the context of two successive material
support criminal trials (the first having ended on a hung jury)."o At the
147. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 81
(D.D.C. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
148. Holy Land Found, 333 F.3d at 164-65.
149. Id. at 165.
150. See infra Part II.C.
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designation stage of the conflict between HLF and the government, the
ability to resort to classified, ex parte, and even hearsay evidence
essentially mooted the constitutional and statutory claims pending further
(criminal) proceedings, by which time HLF would not be permitted to
contest that the organization to which it had allegedly contributed was a
terrorist organization."'
Judge Sentelle's 2002 opinion then proceeded to treat the merits
of the RFRA claim, which the district court had dismissed on the
grounds that HLF had failed to allege in its complaint that it was a
religious organization or that it was engaged in an "actual exercise of
religion" as an organization.152 Sentelle declined to reach this issue of
whether a corporation can be a "person whose religious exercise has
been burdened in violation" of RFRA, preferring to hold instead that,
whatever HLF's standing to bring a RFRA claim, it could not claim that
its religious exercise had been burdened. This portion of the court's
opinion is worth quoting at some length:
No one on behalf of Holy Land Foundation has
forwarded the proposition that the fomenting and
spread of terrorism is mandated by the religion of
Islam. At most they argue a right to charitable
giving as a pillar of that religion. Acting against the
funding of terrorism does not violate the free
exercise rights protected by RFRA and the First
Amendment. There is no free exercise right to fund
terrorists. The record clearly supports a conclusion
that HLF did.'
This analysis is at once self-evident and somewhat confusing.
The self-evident part is the statement that religious liberty does not shield
the provision of money to terrorists. The confusing aspect derives from
Sentelle's conflicting statements that (a) HLF does not embrace the
151. See 8 U.S.C. § 189(a)(8) (2004) ("[I]f a designation under this
subsection has become effective ... a defendant in a criminal action . . . shall not be
permitted to raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such
designation as a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing").
152. Holy Land Found , 219 F. Supp. 2d at 83; Holy Land Found, 333 F.3d at
161.
153. Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 167 (citation omitted). The court granted
summary judgment to OFAC on this claim.
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stigmatizing proposition that Islam mandates the support of terrorism and
(b) HLF is advancing the very broad claim that there is a free exercise
right to fund terrorism. Exactly how these two statements relate is
unclear. If HLF is only insisting that there is a "right to charitable giving
as a pillar of' Islam, the conclusion that "there is no free exercise right to
fund terrorists" only makes sense if the right to charitable giving that
HLF is claiming does in fact entail the support of terrorism. Yet Judge
Sentelle properly excluded from the field of argument any intent to
associate Islam in general with mandatory charitable subsidies for
terrorism.
There is more than one way to reconcile these statements, but the
best explanation for them may involve two aspects of the proceedings,
one peculiar to the HLF designation, and a second that characterizes the
Muslim American charity cases more generally. The specific rationale
for HLF's designation as an SDGT is that it supported the Hamas
organization, which (as we have seen) was named a terrorist organization
by President Clinton in early 1995.154 But the evidence behind that
designation did not involve direct payments from HLF to Hamas. Rather,
OFAC acted on the basis of HLF's payments to the so-called zakat
committees of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Formally independent
entities whose mission was to distribute charitable aid to needy
Palestinians, these committees were, according to the prosecution in the
HLF criminal case, under the effective control of Hamas, and HLF was
aware of that relationship at all times.155 In the D.C. Circuit oral
argument in the civil designation proceedings, HLF's lawyers
nonetheless asserted, to the contrary, that for RFRA purposes there was a
distinction to be made between cases in which an organization had
154. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
155. The prosecution's position is reflected in MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS:
POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD (2006). Levitt served
as an expert witness in the Holy Land criminal case and in several other cases
involving Muslim charities. For a contrasting perspective, arguing that Levitt's work
relies on webs of association involving sometimes distant and tenuous links, see
Benthall, supra note 82; and Jonathan Benthall, The Palestinian Zakat Committees
1993-2007 and Their Contested Interpretations, GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, PROGRAM FOR THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION(S) OCCASIONAL PAPER (2008), available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=94618&lng=en.
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concededly given to a designated terrorist organization, and cases, such
as HLF's, in which no such direct relationship was alleged:
HLF: [The government's lawyer] said that what we
are arguing for, under RFRA, the First
Amendment, and so on, is the right to as a religious
matter to support a terrorist organization, or the
right to associate with a terrorist organization.
That's not what we are arguing for. That's what
distinguishes this case from cases like the
Humanitarian Law Project, the Farrakhan case
156
from the district court here in D.C. _ those were
cases where there was no dispute that the would-be
charitable giver wanted to contribute to
organizations that have been designated.
The Court: What is it that you want to do that you
have been prevented to do by the action under
review in this case? -
HLF: We want to prove that we are not ...
The Court: No, no, no. Not what you want to prove
in this case. What is the ultimate result you want?
What is it you want to do that the Secretary or
Attorney General is preventing you from doing?
HLF: We want to make charitable and
humanitarian contributions, not to Hamas, and
that's what we want to do.
The Court: Are you prevented from making
charitable contributions to anybody at the present
time?
HLF: Absolutely.
The Court: You can't make them to anybody?
156. Farrakhan v. Reagan, 669 F.Supp. 506 (D.D.C., June 3, 1987) (holding
free exercise does not require the government to accommodate a Muslim
organization's wish to send monies to Libya in violation of U.S. sanctions against
that country). See text at note 151, infra.
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HLF: Every dime is blocked. All of HLF's
furniture has been taken, the office equipment has
been removed, the employees are out of work.
The Court: All that's left is the lawyer.1 57
This exchange apparently had little impact on the three-judge
panel that decided the case. But it does suggest a layer of complexity not
reflected in the idea that "there is no free exercise right to fund
terrorists." 5 8 And in so doing, it links up to a second and more generally
applicable characteristic of the Muslim charity cases that underlies Judge
Sentelle's discussion.
This more generally applicable feature of the proceedings is that
a designated entity cannot prevail by making a chilling effect or
overbreadth type of argument.159 That is, the charity cannot hope to
prevail on the argument that the designation must be found unlawful
where the organization is engaged in at least some legitimate and
indisputably religious charitable activity, even if it is also found to have
supported some terrorist activity. The standard of review provides for
setting aside arbitrary and capricious designations, but has nothing to say
about how OFAC ought to use its discretion in deciding whether to
designate organizations whose conduct includes both legal and illegal
activity. That discretion is vested entirely in OFAC, and to the extent
that a designated organization wishes to pursue a religious liberty
157. As transcribed from the court's digital recording of the oral argument in
Holy Land Found for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, No. 02-5307 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 22,
2003). This portion of the argument comes at roughly the thirty-third minute of the
recording. Oral Argument at 33:00, Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 156 (No. 02-5307). The lawyer for HLF is John D. Cline; Douglas Letter
argued for the Department of Justice.
158. Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 167.
159. Not coincidentally, these claims are also foreign to the law of free
exercise and RFRA.
160. The statute governing designation of FTOs requires that the Secretary of
State find that the organization is "foreign" and "engages in terrorist activity" (as
defined elsewhere in the U.S. Code) and that such activity threatens the security of
American nationals or the national security. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2004). Because
of the foreign policy implications, federal courts are required to give these
determinations "even more latitude than in the domestic context." Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
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challenge, it must do so using a broad brush, effectively implying that
illegal as well as legal activity is protected by religious freedom. 161
It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that HLF is not
the only Muslim charity whose religious liberty pleadings have met with
the assertion that free exercise does not shield the financing of violence.
The legal battles of the Islamic American Relief Agency in the Terror
Decade suggest the scope and thrust of the emerging constitutional
landscape. IARA was established in Columbia, Missouri in 1985 by a
group of Sudanese immigrants as the Islamic African Relief Agency, its
professed goal to aid victims of that year's Sudanese famine and other
humanitarian disasters.162 At the time of its incorporation as a 501(c)(3),
a foreign organization based in the Sudan itself existed under the name
Islamic African Relief Agency.163 The Missouri-based entity changed its
name in 2000 to the Islamic American Relief Agency.' In 2004,
following prolonged FBI wiretaps of the American entity's officers, both
the Sudanese-based and the Missouri-based IARA entities were
designated as SDGTs, the latter on the theory that it was in fact a branch
office of and fundraiser for the former.165 Four years later, the Missouri
IARA was indicted and charged with violating U.S. sanctions against
Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein and improperly sending funds
to Pakistan on behalf of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (the notorious Afghan
warlord who had once received millions from the CIA before going on to
serve briefly as Afghanistan's foreign minister and later as a sometime
ally of Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban).166
IARA challenged its designation in the D.C. district court,
pleading inter alia that OFAC's enforcement action violated the charity's
161. Because Judge Sentelle found no substantial burden on HLF's religious
exercise to begin with, it was unnecessary in this case to reach the question of
whether OFAC had used the "least restrictive means" of furthering a compelling
government interest.
162. Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d
34, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2005).
163. Id. at 40.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34; R. Jeffrey Smith,
Siljander Pleads Guilty in Islamic American Relief Agency Lobbying Case, WASH.
POST. (July 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article
/2010/07/07/AR2010070705205.html.
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First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.167 The cause of
action as laid out in the complaint seems both better and less well
handled than in HLF's case. On the one hand, IARA failed to plead a
RFRA violation in addition to or instead of the constitutional free
exercise claim.168 That the organization did not speaks either to bad
lawyering in disregard of Smith or to the irrelevance of RFRA in the
post-9/11 era. On the other hand, unlike HLF, IARA was careful to
clearly allege that it was a religious organization engaged in religious
conduct involving both donors and employees:
IARA-USA and its Muslim donors and employees
support and participate in IARA-USA's work
because it fulfills their religious obligation as
Muslims to engage in Zakat (humanitarian
charitable giving) .... By blocking IARA-USA's
assets on the eve of Ramadan, defendants have
substantially burdened the exercise of religion by
IARA-USA and its Muslim donors and
employees."l69 This appeal to the interests of
IARA's donors did not escape the eye of the
attorneys on the other side, who moved to dismiss
the count on the basis that IARA, as an
organization, lacked standing to object to a burden
on the religious exercise of its members,
employees, or donors.17 0
The district court adopted the government's standing analysis as
well as its citation to a pre-9/1 1, pre-Smith decision rejecting a Muslim
organization's theory that the free exercise clause required the
167. Islamic Am. ReliefAgency, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34.
168. Id.
169. Complaint at 65-66, Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI
Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C., Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-2264 (RBW)).
170. On this point, the Government cited Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) ("[I]t is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect
of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion."). The DOJ
further argued that, on the merits, "[a]ny Muslims among plaintiffs employees and
past donors remain entirely free to fulfill the obligation of zakat through multitudes
of charitable organizations and causes aside from IARA-USA." Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified
FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2005) (No. 04-2264 (RBW)).
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government to accommodate its wish to send monies to Libya in
violation of U.S. sanctions against that country. 7 1 On appeal two years
later, the D.C. Circuit essentially echoed its earlier approach in the HLF
litigation, choosing to disregard the jurisdictional issue (just as it had
largely overlooked the question of whether HLF was a religious
organization), and instead hold on the merits that "[t]here is no free
exercise right to fund terrorists." 72
B. Fungibility and Humanitarian Law Project
This "no free exercise right" refrain might suggest that free
exercise or RFRA arguments have a peculiar vulnerability in the Muslim
charity cases. In fact, the holding sweeps in the entire range of
constitutional rights. In particular, it extends to the law of the First
Amendment generally. The D.C. Circuit's IARA free exercise holding
was preceded by a lengthier discussion of the plaintiffs freedom of
association claim. There, as in the HLF litigation, the court relied on a
then-widely cited Ninth Circuit opinion by Judge Kozinski in
Humanitarian Law Project that has since been superseded by the
Supreme Court's decision in that case. Writing for a unanimous three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski affirmed the lower
court's holding that the statute's use of the terms "training" and
"personnel," as examples of "material support," were unconstitutionally
vague. But the court otherwise rejected the Humanitarian Law Project's
First Amendment argument that it could not be prosecuted for supporting
the peaceful goals of LTTE and the PKK (two non-Muslim, secular
171. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55. The earlier case is
Farrakhan, 669 F. Supp. 506. Without using the term, Farrakhan is in fact an early
expression of the doctrine of fungibility, for it rejected the plaintiff's claim on the
additional basis that "we cannot ascertain what will happen to the money once it
reaches Libya. Conceivably, the money could be used for purely innocuous
purposes, or it could be used, directly or indirectly, to subsidize the types of anti-
United States activity that the sanction regulations aim to prevent." Farrakhan, 669
F. Supp. at 511.
172. Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 737 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
organizations) because "there is no constitutional right to facilitate
terrorism."1 73
Although, as we have seen, it did not involve a religious
organization or a religious liberty claim, this decision by the Ninth
Circuit has come to assume a foundational role in the Muslim charity
cases, as HLF's oral argument before the D.C. Circuit in 2003 suggests.
Central to Judge Kozinski's ruling was the principle that "money is
fungible; giving support intended to aid an organization's peaceful
activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts." 7 4 The
first decision to reflect this movement from secular to religious
applications of fungibility is the D.C. district court's 2002 decision in
HLF, which cited Judge Kozinski's rejection of HLF's argument that the
government had failed to adopt the least restrictive means of furthering
its compelling interest in protecting national security. "Money is
fungible," Judge Kessler explained, "and the Government has no other,
narrower, means of ensuring that even charitable contributions to a
terrorist organization are actually used for legitimate purposes."1
There have been many critiques of this doctrine as an animating
principle of the financial war on terror, including its reliance on an
173. Holder, 205 F.3d at 1133. Kozinksi here distinguishes the Humanitarian
Law Project's free association claim from that in NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware,
458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment restricts a state's ability to
impose liability on an individual solely because of his association with another in the
context of a peaceful boycott). Claiborne Hardware, Kozinski said, involved
punishment by reason of association alone: mere membership or espousal of views,
as opposed to the provision of weapons or explosives to carry out terrorist missions.
As noted above, a later round of this same litigation in the Ninth Circuit eventually
led Congress, in 2004, to amend AEDPA to require knowledge that the recipient
entity was a designated entity or has/is engaged in terrorist activity. In that later
round, the government argued that it could convict an individual of material support
even if she did not know that her donations were going to a designated organization.
See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142-48 (C.D.
Cal. 2005); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 382, 397 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 393 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 2004). See also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, supra note 11, at 29.
174. Holder, 205 F.3d at 1136. The doctrine had been developed in the
Government's trial court and appellate briefs, based on statements by officials
invoking the phrase "money is fungible" in the legislative history of AEDPA.
175. Holy Land Found, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (citing Holder, 205 F.3d at 1136
and Farrakhan, 559 F. Supp. at 512).
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outdated or inapplicable money laundering tradition of criminal
enforcement and its impact on humanitarian organizations serving in
post-9/1 1-sensitive conflict areas.177 The implications for religious liberty
issues have been relatively underemphasized. Where a designated
organization is concerned, fungibility performs two operations that are
critical in this context. First, it collapses legal and illegal uses of
money. Second, because Humanitarian Law Project was brought as a
secular case that has since become the dominant precedent in the
financial war on terror, the fungibility doctrine funnels religious liberty
concerns into a secular First Amendment framework that leaves room for
only a very narrow range of free speech and free association interests.
The Supreme Court has now clarified that this range encompasses only
membership (which is protected by the Scales decision of the
McCarthyism era) 179 and uncoordinated political advocacy: that is,
speech that promotes the goals and views of a designated organization,
176. See Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance, supra note 44, at 394-95; WARDE,
supra note 26; DE GOEDE, supra note 29.
177. Courtney Martin, The Supreme Court Stifles Humanitarian Groups, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT (June 25, 2010), available at http://prospect.org/article/
supreme-court-stifles-humanitarian-groups-0; COLE, supra note 26, at 61-64.
178. The idea, at its most basic, is that any single unit of money can be
substituted for another. A dollar given to an organization to defray the cost of health
care for its members or to aid the poor is a dollar that it does not have to spend on
building a bomb. Fungibility says, in effect, that the first of these dollars is
functionally the same as the second. In this form, the idea has a self-evident
character to it, and indeed its self-evident truth is generally assumed in economic
theory. But see Johannes Abeler & Felix Marklein, Fungibility, Labels, and
Consumption, (IZA Discussion Paper No. 3500 May 2008), http://ssm.com/
abstract=1 139870.
179. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (reversing a conviction for
membership in the Community Party under the Smith Act and holding that the
government must prove not only membership but also a specific intent to further the
Party's illegal ends). In fact, however, it is not clear that even membership in an
FTO is protected after Humanitarian Law Project. The definition of "support"
includes the term "personnel," which is further defined to include the act of
providing one's own self to a group and being subject to its direction or control. The
Court did not reach this particular issue because the plaintiff's proposed actions did
not implicate it. See Chesney, supra note 67, at 18 n.30.
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but without any nexus to the personnel or operations of that
organization.'so
The criminal cases of IARA and HLF well illustrate how this
very expansive, secular concept of fungibility has occupied the field of
religiously inflected constitutional disputation in the financial war on
terror. Following its designation battles in civil court, as we have seen,
the Missouri IARA was indicted in federal court in 2008 on charges of
violating the IEEPA and the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations by transferring
monies into Iraq during the regime of Saddam Hussein. LARA moved to
dismiss on RFRA grounds, inter alia. As if to confirm the impossibility
of prevailing on such a claim in the case of a designated organization
post-9/11, the district court assumed without deciding that IARA's
presumably sincere religious beliefs had been burdened by the
government's restrictions on economic intercourse with Iraq.isi The
government satisfied the compelling interest standard by the need to
maintain national security and public safety through the IEEPA and the
Iraqi Sanctions Regulations. That left only the question of whether it had
adopted the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. And on this
decisive point, as in the D.C. district court's analysis of the free
association claim in HLF's civil case, that question was reducible to
fungibility.182 Because there is no way to determine what use is finally
180. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2722-24;
Scales, 367 U.S. at 229-30.
181. United States v. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, No. 07-00087-CR-W-KL,
2009 WL 4016478, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2009). The government took the
position that the defendants' exercise of religion was not substantially burdened
because Islam does not require giving money to the poor in Iraq as a means of
complying with the obligation of zakat. Id. at *6. One of the cases cited by the
district court in its discussion of the law on substantial burdens under RFRA is
instructive in this regard. In Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd of Zoning
Adjustment of D.C., the court held that it was a substantial burden for a local
government to prohibit a church, via zoning regulation, from feeding homeless
persons on its premises. 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994). The differences between
these facts and the diffuse, transnational giving patterns typical of Muslim American
charity suggests that the scope of First Amendment protections depends at least in
part on the nature of the religious-philanthropic culture at issue. For a portrait of
these differences in the case of one Muslim-American philanthropic tradition, see
NAJAM, supra note 88.
182. As construed by Judge Kozinski in the Humanitarian Law Project
litigation. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 2009 WL 4016478, at *1l (citing Holy Land
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made of the donated funds once they cross over from U.S. into foreign
territory, "a total embargo on monetary funds is the least restrictive
means to further the national security goals of IEEPA."8 Fungibility
provides an automatic answer to the narrow tailoring prong of RFRA.
C. The Holy Land Criminal Case
The very name of the Holy Land case evokes diametrically
opposed and passionately held views that have likely been reinforced
rather than mitigated since the Fifth Circuit finally resolved it on
December 27, 2011.184 The defendants were never charged with carrying
out any terrorist acts, or even with subsidizing a specific act of violence
committed by someone else. The trial was nonetheless pervaded by
disturbing images and memories of Israeli civilians killed in suicide
bombings by Hamas militants who, according to the prosecution, had
been incentivized to commit these acts by promises of charitable support
for their soon-to-be orphaned children. On the other side, lawyers evoked
sympathetic pictures of suffering Palestinian refugees in the occupied
territories of the West Bank and Gaza receiving alms from co-religionists
in the United States. HLF acknowledged that the orphans of suicide
bombers may have received some of its funds, but only as part of a
general charitable policy to aid Palestinian children in need, not as an
incentive to terrorism.'8 In between stood the federal government, its
authority now directed towards the post-9/11 invigoration of the material
support laws rather than facilitating an Israeli-Palestinian peace process
in tatters. One indication of how deeply polarizing the case eventually
became is that, when the Voice of Witness, a progressive human rights
nonprofit that sponsors books and other educational activities, published
Found, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 82, which itself relies on the Ninth Circuit's 2000
Humanitarian Law Project decision).
183. Islamic Am. ReliefAgency, 2009 WL 4016478, at *4.
184. Holy Land filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court in May
2012 that was denied on October 29, 2012. On the Holy Land litigation, see Wadie
Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543
(2011); Jonathan Benthall, An Unholy Tangle: Boim Versus the Holy Land
Foundation, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1 (2011); and Michael G. Freedman,
Prosecuting Terrorism: The Material Support Statute and Muslim Charities, 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1113 (2011).
185. WARDE, supra note 26, at 147.
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a collection of "narratives of post-9/11 injustice," its board of directors
was sharply divided about whether even to include an account written by
one of the HLF defendants.1 86
Established in the 1980s, the Holy Land Foundation was, at the
time of its designation as an SDGT in December 2001, the largest
Muslim American charity. I have already described some of the
contentions in the civil litigation that followed in the wake of that
designation. Those proceedings were but a prelude to the even more
bitterly divisive criminal case first brought in 2004. The outcome of the
initial trial amply demonstrated how ideologically overloaded and hotly
contested the proceedings had become: the jury simply could not agree
on the vast majority of the charges against most of the defendants,
including the central material support charges, producing a mistrial and a
second trial in 2008.188
The government's theory of the case echoed the basis of the
OFAC designation: HLF was prosecuted not for providing direct aid to
the designated organization in question (Hamas), but for providing aid to
a number of zakat committees that were either transparently controlled
by Hamas (as the government argued) or substantially independent of
that organization (as the defendants maintained). It was for the jury to
decide, as a factual matter involving knowledge and intent, that sending
payments to the zakat committees amounted to the same thing as making
contributions directly to Hamas. The jury in the second trial concluded
that it was, and convicted the defendants on all counts.
In between the verdict and the resolution of the defendants'
appeal by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court issued its previously
186. PATRIOT ACTS: NARRATIVES OF POST-9/11 INJUSTICE 190 (Alia Malek
ed., 2011). The volume did ultimately include Ghassan Elashi's account, but
prefaced it with the statement that "his story is included in this collection because he
was found guilty under a law - material support for terrorism - that has come under
fire from civil rights, civil liberties and human rights groups for criminalizing, and
branding as terrorism, acts that include those that are nonviolent, or are without
violent intention." Id. In other words, the rationale for including Elashi's account
mirrored the theory of the plaintiffs challenge in the Humanitarian Law Project
litigation.
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. Leslie Eaton, Judge Declares Mistrial in Muslim Charity Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/world/americas/22iht-
22holy.8005339.html.
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summarized opinion in Humanitarian Law Project.189 HLF's criminal
appeal shows the impact of the twelve-year-long litigation in
Humanitarian Law Project in more than one respect. As with most
federal criminal appeals, many of the defendants' contentions involved
intricate objections to the admissibility of certain evidence and the
legality of FBI searches and surveillance. One of the central disputes
involved whether the district court had correctly admitted evidence of the
defendants' relationship to Hamas prior to its designation as a terrorist
organization in 1996. Although such pre-designation ties with Hamas
were perfectly legal, the Fifth Circuit held, they showed that the
defendants had the intent needed to violate the material support statute
after the 1996 designation: namely, knowledge that their contributions to
the Palestinian zakat committees were effectively direct contributions to
Hamas.1 9 0 To the extent that such evidence of intent raised a First
Amendment issue, it did so as a matter of free speech rather than
religious liberty. Thus, after citing the settled doctrine permitting the
evidentiary use of protected speech to establish the elements of a crime,
the appellate panel invoked the newly endorsed principle of
Humanitarian Law Project that "Congress could criminalize speech that
provides material support to designated terrorists."'
1 9 1
The religious liberty claims asserted in the earlier civil cases and
in the pretrial stages of the criminal case had effectively dropped out of
the picture. And the central facts of the case were now framed by the
newly endorsed fungibility and legitimacy concerns of Humanitarian
Law Project. Thus, in recounting the evidence at trial, the Fifth Circuit
described a "social wing" of the Hamas organization that provides for the
needy through the operation of schools and hospitals. This social wing,
the court said, had helped Hamas to win the "hearts and minds" of
Palestinians and thereby accrue legitimacy. And "support[ing] the
189. See supra Part lI.A.
190. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 527-54 (5th Cir. 2011). The
court did find that the district court had erred in admitting certain items of evidence,
but held that such errors were not prejudicial to the defendants given the total body
of evidence supporting the requisite intent elements of the material support offense.
For example, Judge King ruled that the district court should not have admitted as lay
evidence the testimony of a Treasury Department official about OFAC's practices in
designating or not designating sub-groups of terrorist organizations. Id. at 512.
191. Id. at 537 (citing Holder, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2724).
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families of Hamas prisoners and suicide bombers [provided] incentives
for bombing . . . while also freeing up resources for Hamas to devote to
its military and political activities," demonstrating fungibility in both of
the two senses identified by Chief Justice Roberts in Humanitarian Law
Project. 192
D. Fungibility's Limits: The Al Haramain Litigation
There are limits to the fungibility doctrine. One obvious limit
already mentioned is that, on its face at least, the doctrine only applies in
the material support context, where a designated terrorist organization is
involved either directly or indirectly. 193 In the conclusion of this Article,
I suggest that the post-9/1 1 articulation of fungibility risks escaping these
boundaries, seeping into other aspects of religious liberty and free speech
law, as well as neighboring areas of constitutional law. But for now, let
us posit, as Chief Justice Roberts insists in Humanitarian Law Project,
that material support law has no bearing on the boundaries of political
speech outside of the FTO context, or even within that context so long as
it consists of uncoordinated advocacy.' 9 4 I have been able to identify
exactly one lower-court decision from the Terror Decade--either before
or after the Supreme Court decided Humanitarian Law Project-that
places any limits on the fungibility doctrine. Those limits are not
negligible, but they confirm the larger narrative about the diffusion of
Muslim American charitable religious liberty claims in the post-9/11 era
told in these pages.
The case is the Ninth Circuit's very recent decision in the Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Department of Treasury. The Al
Haramain Foundation is an international Muslim charity with offices
192. Id. at 485-86.
193. This limitation is apparent from the Supreme Court's discussion of
congressional intent behind the material support for terrorism statutes. See, e.g.,
Holder, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2709.
194. Id. at 2724-25. 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A), unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B),
requires proof of an actual intent to support terrorist activity, and therefore cannot be
extended so easily to situations that would be covered by fungibility under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339(B). See 18 U.S.C. §2339A(a) (2006) (establishing criminal penalties for one
who "provides material support or resources ... knowing or intending that they are
to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of" statutes prohibiting
violent terrorist acts).
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throughout the Islamic world, one of the largest of which was located in
Saudi Arabia. Al Haramain also had what is believed to be an American
office located in Ashland, Oregon, incorporated separately under Oregon
state law as Al Haramain-Oregon. In 2004, the Treasury Department
designated Al Haramain-Oregon as an SDGT, alleging a direct
connection between the U.S. branch and Osama bin Laden.'9 5 The
Treasury Department focused in particular on a transaction that did not
involve Bin Laden per se but rather Al Haramain-Oregon's possible role
in transferring a donation of about $150,000 from an Egyptian national to
Chechen militants associated with acts of terrorism in Russia. Al
Haramain asserted that the donation in question was intended to be used
for humanitarian purposes in Chechyna.19 6
Al Haramain-Oregon eventually brought a lawsuit against
OFAC, alleging violation of its First Amendment and other constitutional
and statutory rights in the designation and order blocking its assets
pending investigation. It was joined in this lawsuit by the Multicultural
Association of Southern Oregon (MCASO), which sought on free speech
grounds to enjoin the government from applying the material support
laws to MCASO's efforts to "engage in advocacy coordinated with and
for the benefit of [Al Haramain]-Oregon" on free speech and free
association grounds. The court agreed with Al Haramain-Oregon that its
Fifth Amendment right to due process and Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures had been violated by OFAC in the
designation process, but found that the former violation was harmless
and remanded the latter for a remedial hearing by the district court.1 97
In analyzing MCASO's free speech claim, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the Al Haramain-Oregon organization was "neither
195. Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 686 F.3d
965, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2012); 9/11 COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 90, at 169-171;
Alterman, supra note 90, at 64. See also DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, MY YEAR
INSIDE RADICAL ISLAM: A MEMOIR (2007) (recounting the author's experiences
working for the Al Haramain Foundation in Oregon as a convert to Islam); and JUAN
C. ZARATE, TREASURY'S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL
WARFARE 67-76 (2013) (describing the efforts of American officials to gain Saudi
approval of the effort to shut down the Al Haramain Foundation). Zarate's book
appeared after this article was submitted for publication and so could not be fully
incorporated into its analysis.
196. Al Haramain Islamic Found., 686 F.3d at 973.
197. Id. at 995.
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wholly domestic nor wholly foreign," a mixed status that bore on just
how far the fungibility, legitimacy, and foreign policy rationales of
Humanitarian Law Project applied to the facts of this case.19 The Ninth
Circuit carefully parsed the Supreme Court's language as to each of the
three rationales. With respect to fungibility, it concluded that Al
Haramain-Oregon's status as a (largely but not solely) domestic
organization meant there was only a "less direct and more speculative"
possibility that its advocacy could free up resources for the larger Saudi-
based Al Haramain organization.19 9 As to the legitimacy concern, the
court concluded that there was only a "small difference" between a
"vigorous independent advocacy campaign"-which the Supreme Court
in Humanitarian Law Project observed was not within the scope of the
material support statute-and "a coordinated advocacy campaign." The
Ninth Circuit insisted that the Supreme Court had not reached the
1 .~200 Fnly
constitutionality of a ban on the latter (coordinated advocacy). Finally,
as to the foreign policy concern, the court found that the risk that foreign
nations would take offense at MCASO's activities was diminished
because MCASO sought to assist only Al Haramain-Oregon, a
"domestic" branch of the larger Al Haramain organization. Such
assistance could not be equated with the "direct training of a wholly
foreign organization active at war with an ally, at issue in [Humanitarian
,,201
Law Project].
The Ninth Circuit's holding that MCASO has a free speech right
to engage in coordinated advocacy of Al Haramain-Oregon is an
important ruling, but one that is itself distinctly limited in two respects
relevant to the context of Muslim American charity. First, while
disavowing a formal distinction between "foreign" and "domestic"
organizations, the holding relies heavily on the relative differences
between foreign and domestic entities to say, in effect, that free speech
protections are far greater in the latter case. In its predominant
contemporary forms, as we have seen, Muslim American charitable
giving is an essentially diasporic, transnational phenomenon, which
198. Id. at 998. In Holder, the Supreme Court declined to reach whether
Congress would apply a material support statute like that applicable to FTOs to a
domestic organization. 561 U.S. at _,_ 130 S.Ct. at 2730.
199. Al Haramain Islamic Found., 686 F.3d at 999.
200. Id. at 1000.
201. Id.
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means it can only benefit so much from a First Amendment that, in
effect, protects only non-diasporic charity and humanitarianism. Second,
the ruling is a secular (free speech) one that applies only to the secular,
non-Muslim party in the case, a limitation that, albeit not in any
intentional or straightforward sense, is indicative of what has become of
Muslim American religious liberty claims in the Terror Decade.
III. PARADOXES OF NON-ESTABLISHMENT AND "CHURCH
AUTONOMY"
This Article has thus far addressed only some of the Muslim
American charity cases of the last ten years, ones that seem to present the
most difficult and inconvenient facts for religious liberty advocates.
Here-where war and religion meet face to face in an apparently
uncompromising fashion-may be "the hardest place" 202 in the
contemporary American religious liberty landscape. It is a hard place in
the sense that it is exceedingly difficult to render "comprehensive and
consistent moral judgments" about the proper scope of religious freedom
when the politics of the cases are so vexed, and the lines between
legislative, executive, and judicial authority so fraught with perceptions
203
of potentially imminent and catastrophic danger.
Some of these cases present more difficult situations than others.
Some reflect the complicated legacies of many decades of international
204
strife in places like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. Others reflect deep
202. Cf MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xxv (4th ed. 2006) (examining the overlap of
politics and morality in arguments surrounding the war in and occupation of Iraq).
203. Id. See also Nancy L. Rosenblum, Constitutional Reason of State: The
Fear Factor, in DISSENT IN DANGEROUS TIMES 146 (Austin Sarat ed., 2005)
(examining constitutional reasoning of state actors during times of unrest).
204. Indeed 9/11 was itself in some ways the legacy of this strife, as Steve Coll
has demonstrated in GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA,
AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001
(2004). Coll shows that from the beginning of the Afghan jihad against Soviet rule,
Saudi intelligence used religious charities to send money to favored Afghan
commanders outside the control of either the Pakistani or American intelligence
services. Id. at 83-88. See also LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-
QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 (2006). The significance of the American role in
supporting the Afghan jihad for the post-9/11 crackdown on Muslim American
charities is suggested in Benthall, supra note 82, at 117.
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disagreements within the Muslim American community, and between
Muslims here and those abroad, over conflicting elements of the Islamic
tradition-including the complex relationship between zakat and jihad-
that were shaped in distant times and places and are now adapting to an
American stage. These issues, and others related to them, are not
primarily the province of legal scholarship, but belong instead to the
study of the history, theology, and politics of Muslim America and the
Muslim world.2 05
Moreover, the analysis thus far does not entail that free exercise
or RFRA arguments should have prevailed in all of these cases, or even
in any one particular case. But I do say that there is much more to this
story than judicial language like "there is no free exercise right to fund
terrorists" suggests. We can, and should, dig deeper than this as lawyers.
To do so, we will have first to understand the role of a very different set
of legal principles than those at work at the nexus between material
support and the First Amendment. We will have to grasp how, in this
particular context (but not only in this context), free exercise values
interact with those of non-establishment and religious institutional
autonomy. This is, of course, one of the classic themes of the law of
206
religious liberty. And yet, the Muslim charity cases show that we have
still to fully understand its implications for the fate of religious liberty in
the Terror Decade.
A. Religious Institutional Autonomy as Separation of Church and State
In a 1998 article, Kent Greenawalt subsumed under the label
"hands off' a line of cases holding that courts (and governmental actors
more generally) ought not to meddle in controversies implicating the
205. See BONNER, supra note 113, at 173-174 (discussing what the author
describes as a "permanent" tension between militancy and generosity in the Islamic
tradition); see generally REZA ASLAN, No GOD BUT GOD: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION,
AND FUTURE OF ISLAM (updated ed. 2011) (explaining the origins and evolution of
Islam, with a focus on the events of the last decade). For a critique of post-9/11
human rights and civil liberties scholarship on the grounds that it fails to treat
terrorism itself as a human rights violation, see Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture,
26 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. I passim (2008).
206. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY, & THOMAS C.
BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (3d ed. 2011); 1 GREENAWALT, supra
note 1, at 1.
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theological and doctrinal concerns of a religious institution or
community.207 Beginning in 1871, with the Supreme Court's decision in
208
Watson v. Jones, a church property dispute involving rival factions of
a Presbyterian church in Louisville, Kentucky, American courts have
generally declined to exercise jurisdiction over cases that would require
them to interpret contested questions of theological orthodoxy. This is
true whether the underlying dispute concerns title to church property or
other matters relating to the internal leadership of a religious
209
institution.
Thus, in the recently decided case of Hosanna-Tabor, the
Supreme Court relied on the church autonomy line of cases and the
"hands off' principle in holding that a person who qualifies as a
"minister" cannot bring a claim for employment-related discrimination
210
against her church employer. Such matters, Justice Roberts held for a
unanimous court (the only disagreement revolved around the scope of the
term "minister"), were protected from government intrusion by both the
establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.2 11
Hosanna-Tabor is the latest in a long line of Supreme Court
cases that define the American tradition of separation of church and state
212
in opposition to the Anglo-British establishmentarian tradition. But the
"hands off' principle has proven to offer very little protection to
religious institutions and practices that are implicated in actual or
perceived criminal activity.
This is so for two reasons. Hosanna-Tabor itself suggests the
first. Institutional autonomy arguments resonate when they involve
207. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998).
208. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
209. The Court has since complicated this body of law (which does have a
partial antecedent in the Watson case itself) in the form of an alternative doctrine
known as the so-called "neutral principles" line of cases, not relevant here. But the
basic "hands off' doctrine as regards the adjudication or interpretation of contested
questions of religious meaning is still good law. See, e.g. Watson, 80 U.S. at 679.
210. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565
U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
211. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct at 709.
212. See, e.g. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727-29, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
132 S. Ct at 702-04 (describing the English background of civil control of church
officials against which the founders revolted).
questions of internal institutional leadership. When they cross over into
other areas, such as tort liability or, worse yet, alleged criminal conduct,
the autonomy part of "church autonomy" can very quickly fade away.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court expressly reserved these situations for a later
day, and strongly implied that the criminal liability question was simply
beyond the scope of the ministerial exception doctrine altogether.213 To
the extent that it provided a principled justification for these limits, the
Court relied on the idea that Smith involves "government regulation of
only outward physical acts," whereas Hosanna-Tabor's claim would
have required "government interference with an internal church decision
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself."2 14 However the
lower courts end up developing that distinction, it seems clear enough
that charitable giving, which typically involves the transfer of money or
goods from one person or institution to another, can very easily be placed
on the "outward physical acts" side of the line, no matter that it also
typically involves some of the most deeply felt aspects of a religious
community's "faith and mission." Not surprisingly, we have seen
absolutely no attempt by Muslim American charities or individuals to
invoke the church autonomy line of cases to defend against the post-9/1 1
material support investigations. It seems likely that that this will remain
true after Hosanna-Tabor no less than before.2 15
From another perspective, however, church autonomy, and the
larger American culture of separation of church and state out of which
that autonomy emerges, play a very substantial role in contemporary
controversies over faith-based charitable giving and the war on terror.
The doctrine and the larger culture have indirectly and paradoxically
aggravated the severity of the government's crackdown on Muslim
American charity. This point is best demonstrated comparatively, in
relation to the relatively restrained approach to the investigation and
supervision of Muslim charities that authorities in Britain have adopted.
This comparison has been developed elsewhere and will not be repeated
216
here. Instead, this Article seeks to press the comparison further by
213. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at , 132 S. Ct. at 710.
214. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 707.
215. The institutional defendants in some of the Catholic clergy sex abuse tort
cases have invoked the doctrine, albeit in an absolutist manner that seems to have
been uniformly rejected by the courts. See 2 LAYCOCK, supra note 135, at 325-37.
216. See Ghachem, supra note 16.
200 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 12
2013] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND FINANCIAL WAR 201
filling in some of the legal background and showing that the contrast
between the American "hands off' tradition and a British history of
entanglement with religious controversies is less clear-cut than meets the
eye, which suggests that the differences in question are not structurally
determined but rather contingent and thus subject to modification.
B. English Establishment and the Charity Commission Approach
The comparison posits a relationship between two aspects of
English law and counterterrorism policy: its establishmentarian
background, and its more nuanced and targeted approach to Muslim
217charitable institutions. England has, of course, an established Church.
Its role in British life is largely ceremonial and vestigial, but even purely
formal establishmentarian traditions have substantive consequences, and
218some of these legacies persist into the present. One of those legacies is
a tradition of state control over church doctrine, church officials, and
church institutions-including charitable institutions, which historically
were the domain of the Church in medieval and early modem times.21
Another is a European practice of relying on state-sponsored or state-
affiliated religious councils to serve as interlocutors between minority
faiths and government officials. Such institutions-which would clearly
offend the establishment clause in the United -States-have, in the view
of one scholar studying the French scene, served to make religious
traditions "more comprehensible and less threatening." 2 20 Britain's
variation on this theme is less statist than its. French counterpart-the
Bradford Council for Mosques and the London-based Council of Britain
are both private, but the British government was instrumental in helping
to create both and has provided them substantial funding.22 Britain has
217. HOME OFFICE, LIFE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A JOURNEY TO CITIZENSHIP
50 (2006) ("The Church of England, or Anglican Church as it is also known, came
into existence in 1534.").
218. See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 42-44 (2008).
219. See James Q. Whitman, Separating Church and State: The Atlantic
Divide, 34 HIST. REFLECTIONS 86, 91 (2008).
220. Elisa Wiygul, The Headscarf The French State as Mediator Between
Civil Society and Individuals, 34 HIST. REFLECTIONS 61, 64 (2008).
221. See KENAN MALIK, FROM FATWA TO JIHAD: THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR AND ITS
AFTERMATH 73-79, 123 (2010); Home Office Funds Muslim Council of Britain,
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even provided direct state funding to Muslim schools, which would be
considered unconstitutional in the United States even in the aftermath of
the Supreme Court's recent case law permitting taxpayer funds to go to
sectarian schools under certain conditions.222
These traditions and practices have translated into what many
see as a more interlocutory and collaborative policy of faith-based
charitable regulation in the United Kingdom. The Charity Commission
for England and Wales is an independent agency that serves as the
223
principal charitable regulator in Britain. Its history dates back to 1818,
when Parliament commenced an investigation into charities concerned
224
with the education of the poor. In 2007, the Commission created a
Faith and Social Cohesion Unit (FSCU) whose inaugural project was to
support the British Muslim charitable community in "enhancing and
promoting high standards of governance and accountability . . . ."225
Towards this end, the Commission has also created a Mosques and
Imams National Advisory Board comprised of representations from the
226
various British Muslim associations. These initiatives reflect the
FOIA CENTRE, http://www.foiacentre.com/news-MCB-060510.html (last updated
June 5, 2006).
222. See Eric Pfanner, Britain Debates State Aid for Muslim Schooling, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/17/world/europe/17iht-
redislam.html?_r-2@pagewanted; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 644 (2002) (upholding a school voucher program for low-income families as
consistent with the requirement of official neutrality between religion and non-
religion, where the families retained a "true private choice" over whether to attend a
public or sectarian school).
223. About the Commission, CHARITY COMMISSION, http://www.charity
commission.gov.uk/about-the-commission/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
224. Gregory Clark, The Charity Commission as a Source in English
Economic History, available at www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/
gclark/papers/reh.pdf.
225. Dame Suzi Leather, Address to Churches Main Committee, The
Advancement of Religion and the Public Benefit Requirement, in CHARITY
COMMISSION (Dec. 4, 2007), http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/
Charity requirements guidance/Charity essentials/Public benefit/cmcspeech.aspx.
226. Faith Based Charities, CHARITY COMMISSION, http://www.charity
commission.gov.uk/detailed-guidance/specialist-guidance/faith-based-
charities/#about (last visited Sept. 12, 2013) (discussing the establishment of the
Faith and Social Cohesion Unit and the work undertaken by the Mosques and Imams
National Advisory Board) [hereafter "Introduction to FSCU"]; see also James Shaw-
Hamilton, Recognizing the Umma in Humanitarianism: International Regulation of
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legacy of Britain's turn, beginning in the 1960s, towards a multicultural
227approach for governing minority communities. But the initiatives also
serve a more ambiguous policing function that flows from the
establishment tradition-the specifically Muslim focus of the Charity
Commission's dialogue with faith-based charities followed not long after
the 2005 London subway bombings.
Out of this combination of establishmentarian, multiculturalist,
and counterterrorism impulses, Britain has developed a strategy for the
supervision and investigation of Muslim charities that differs in
significant respects from the American approach.228 The comparatively
restrained and surgical nature of this strategy is not unique to the charity
context; it seems to characterize British counterterrorism policy more
generally.229 Still, the charity cases, precisely because they involve the
powers of government to intervene in and regulate the affairs of religious
institutions specifically, have some distinctive characteristics that speak
to broader differences in constitutional culture. Two examples will
suffice to indicate the nature of these differences.
1. The Interpal Investigation
The Charity Commission's handling of the Palestinians Relief
and Development Fund (Interpal) captures the "entanglement" between
public oversight and private charitable management that can come from
the more interlocutory nature of the British approach. Strictly speaking,
Islamic Charities, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC CHARITIES, supra note 90, at 20
(discussing the establishment of the Faith and Social Cohesion Unit, which works in
conjunction with the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board); MOSQUES AND
IMAMS NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD, http://www.minab.org.uk/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2013).
227. See Christopher McCrudden, Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion,
Equality, and the British Constitution: The JFS Case Considered, 9 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 200, 201-02 (2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1701289.
228. On charitable regulatory policy after 9/11 in Europe, see Julianne Smith
& Natalia Filipiak, Islamic Charities in Europe, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC
CHARITIES, supra note 90, at 15-31, 81-97.
229. See David Cole, The Brits Do It Better, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 12,
2008, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/jun/1 2/the-brits-do
-itbetter/?pagination=false.
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Interpal does not appear to be a "religious" charity, but its website
indicates that its fundraising and emergency aid efforts are keyed to the
Ramadan season during which Muslims traditionally pay their zakat
contributions, and it makes a point of supporting religious activities such
as Qur'anic Tahfiz (memorization) schools, among other causes.230
Alleged to have provided funds to Hamas, the charity was designed as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity by the U.S.
Treasury Department in 2003.231 Following that designation, Interpal was
twice investigated by the Charity Commission, in 1996 and 2003, and
232
twice cleared of charges. A third investigation was opened in 2006,
following accusations made in a BBC program that the charity had
donated to groups guilty of "promoting terrorist ideology or activities."233
That latest investigation concluded in February 2009, with the Charity
Commission issuing a report finding the BBC materials of "insufficient
234evidence" to support the allegations in question. The Commission also
found, however, that Interpal "had not taken sufficient measures" to
235investigate its partner organizations. As a result, the Commission
directed the charity's trustees to discontinue its relationship with a
Hamas-affiliated entity known as the Union for Good and to enhance its
due diligence and monitoring procedures with respect to partner
236
organizations.
One scholar has used this example to illustrate the "apparent
errors" made by U.S. authorities in their investigation of Muslim
charities.237 For purposes of the present analysis, the accuracy issue,
while significant, is less critical than the methodological one. The
230. See Our Work, INTERPAL, http://www.interpal.org/content.aspx?
pagelD=22 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
231. Ian Fisher, Terrorism Plot Raises Concern about Islamic Charities, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/24/world/europe/24iht-
charity.2576960.html.
232. Id.
233. Claire Shropshall, Interpal Cleared of Terrorist Links, CHARITY





237. See DONOHUE, supra note 52, at 176-200.
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Charity Commission's "scalpel" approach238 in this case permitted
British regulators to avoid the significant costs of criminalization and
across-the-board freezing of assets characteristic of American policy. But
the cost is the entanglement of the Commission with the ongoing
operation of the charity. Thus, the Commission's most recent Interpal
inquiry provides that the Commission "will be reviewing with the
trustees" the implementation of its findings regarding the Union for
Good.239
While the Commission's exercise of such supervisory authority
over charities is typically provisional and ongoing rather than definitive
or finite, it contrasts starkly with the arms-length relationship between
(religious or secular) charities and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in
the United States. The IRS relies on period tax filings (forms 990) and
occasional audits to ensure that charities adhere to their stated charitable
purposes in their day-to-day activities (although "churches" and their
functional equivalents, such as mosques and synagogues, are exempted
from the requirement to register as tax-exempt entities or file returns).240
American tax-exempt law does not currently embrace such practices as
temporary public receivership of a religious charity or directions that a
241
religious charity cut off its relationship with specific persons2. In the
absence of the comparatively invasive (but also comparatively
restrained) English remedies, the IRS can resort to one of two solutions
in its pursuit of terrorism-related allegations: (1) revocation of a charity's
238. See supra text at notes 35-36.
239. Shropshall, supra note 233.
240. Ghachem, supra note 16, at 75-76; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX
GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Nov. 2009). ("The term
church is found . . . in the Internal Revenue Code. . . . however, . . . we use it in its
generic sense as a place of worship including, for example, mosques and
synagogues."); see also Victoria B. Bjorklund et al., Terrorism and Money
Laundering: Illegal Purposes and Activities, 25 PACE L. REV. 233, 244 (2005)
(suggesting that "churches" may make "ideal covers" for terrorist financing because
they are not required to file IRS forms 1023 and 990 and often receive cash
donations).
241. No authority for either practice can be found in the leading treatise on the
law of tax-exempt organizations, BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (10th ed. 2011). Social service charities that accept public funds are
subject to government oversight through grant audits.
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tax-exempt status if the charity's conduct offends public policy;242 or (2)
asset forfeiture, designation as a terrorist entity, and criminal
prosecution.243 Not surprisingly, the latter rather than the former has been
the overwhelmingly preferred tactic in the Terror Decade.244
2. The Case of the Finsbury Park Mosque
The second example of the contrast between English and
American methods involves an outspoken Muslim cleric named Abu
Hamza al-Masri and the Finsbury Park mosque in London, which is
owned and operated by a charitable entity called the North London
245
Central Mosque Trust (NLCMT). In early 2003, London police had
raided the mosque as part of a criminal investigation into the discovery
246of the deadly poison ricin at a London apartment. A few weeks later,
the Charity Commission ordered the removal of Abu Hamza from his
247
post as preacher at the Finsbury Park mosque. In a July 2003 report,
the Charity Commission presented the results of its inquiry into Abu
Hamza's activities, noting that he had illegitimately seized control of the
mosque from its trustees, and had made "highly inflammatory" and
"extreme" public statements in his sermons and at a conference marking
the anniversary of 9/11. These statements, the Commission concluded,
violated the mosque's charitable status. The Commission acknowledged
that the trustees had made efforts to gain access to the mosque, but had
248
been prevented from doing so by Abu Hamza and his supporters.
242. The availability and limits of this revocation power are defined by the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-96 (1983).
243. See supra Part L.A.
244. Id.
245. See Don Van Natta, Jr., THREATS AND RESPONSES: RADICAL
ISLAM; London Imam is Removed as Leader of Mosque, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 5, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/05/world/threats-and-responses-radical-islam-
london-imam-is-removed-as-leader-of-mosque.html; see also About Us, NORTH
LONDON CENTRAL MOSQUE TRUST, http://nlcentralmosque.com/about-us.html (last
visited Sept. 14, 2013).
246. See Van Natta, Jr., supra note 245.
247. Id.
248. CHARITY COMMISSION, REPORT OF INQUIRY INTO NORTH LONDON
CENTRAL MOSQUE TRUST, REG. CHARITY No. 299884 IM 14, 22 (July 1, 2003).
Indeed, on the very day before the Commission ordered him removed from the
Finsbury Park mosque, Abu Hamza had reportedly declared that the space shuttle
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Rather than revoke the NLCMT's status, or refer the case to
British criminal law enforcement authorities for action to be taken
against the Trust as a whole, the Charity Commission had recourse to the
scalpel. (In the United States, as indicated above, the Finsbury Park
mosque would not have been required to register or file as a charitable
entity with the IRS in the first place: a revealing indication of the
American separationist distance between institutions of church and state
that all too easily collapses into outright criminalization when religious
organizations are suspected of engaging in criminal activity.)
To do so, the Commission invoked a power delegated to it by the
U.K. Charities Act of 1993 to remove an employee, officer, or agent of a
charity.249 The heading of the application section of the Act provides a
telling indication of the extraordinary nature of this power: "Application
Of Property Cy-Pr&s and Assistance and Supervision of Charities by
Court and Commissioners. Powers of Commissioners to make schemes
and act for protection of charities etc." (The "Court" in question is the
Charity Tribunal, which hears appeals from determinations of the
Commission, which are in turn subject to review by the courts of the
Chancery Division.)
Notice two aspects of this classification of the Commissions'
removal authority: first, it is an instance of cy pros authority, that is, the
equitable power historically exercised by courts to modify the terms of a
testator's charitable gift for purposes of ensuring that the gift is used in
250
conformity with the testator's intentions. Second, this cyprds authority
empowers the Commission "to make schemes and act for protection of
charities. 25 The underlying purpose is the protection of charities. The
specific provision at issue in the Abu Hamza case states that where
"there is or has been any misconduct or mismanagement in the
administration of the charity" such that "it is necessary or desirable to act
for the purpose of protecting the property of the charity," the
Commissioners may, of their own motion, "remove any trustee, charity
Columbia disaster was an act of divine retribution against the United States and
Israel (an Israeli astronaut was a member of the seven-member crew that perished on
February 1, 2003). See Van Natta, Jr., supra note 245.
249. Charities Act, 1993, c. 10, § 18(2)(i) (U.K.).
250. See, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1307, 1313-14 (2010) (discussing the Crown's use of cypr~s authority).
251. Charities Act, 1993, c. 10, § 18 (U.K.).
trustee, officer, agent or employee of the charity who has been
responsible for or privy to" or who has otherwise "contributed to . . . or
facilitated" the misconduct or management.25 2
In the context of Britain's Muslim charities, the relationship
between "protection" and intervention is clearly more complicated than
this generic statutory language would suggest. The Commission's
11 253"protective" mandate is also a disciplinary one. This disciplinary
power flows from England's establishmentarian history no less than the
other prerogatives of the Charity Commission vis-A-vis religious
charities. While characterizing its removal of Abu Hamza as an effort to
guard the line between charitable and non-charitable conduct, the
Commission was in fact exercising a remnant of one of the oldest
authorities in the establishment tradition: government control over
religious doctrine and personnel. And it is this removal power that, in a
comparative light, brushes up directly against the American culture of
separation of church and state.
While there is no Supreme Court precedent directly on point, it
seems far-fetched to say that the IRS could, consistent with the
establishment and free exercise clauses, order an American mosque to
reconsider their choice of imams (as opposed to taking more drastic
measures against the mosque as a whole, against which the First
Amendment per se offers no special protection). The very idea conjures
up horrid notions of the core historical forms of establishment against
which the founders rebelled: direct state subsidies to churches, and state
control of church officials. In both cases, it is no accident that American
law has, ever since, identified such gross offenses to separationist
252. Id. at §§ 18(2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(i). In 2006, Parliament amended the 1993
Charities Act to further empower the Charity Commission, when exercising its
suspension or removal power under section 18, to remove the individual in question
from the organization's membership if that person was a member. See Charities Act,
2006, c. 50, §19 (U.K.).
253. Indeed, one of the two key goals of the FSCU has been to raise awareness
of the FSCU's existence among the apparently large number of unregistered or
informal Muslim charities in the UK; registering these organizations serves to enlist
them in the social contract and make them less prone to evading oversight and
surveillance. The other goal, said the Commission, was to "engage" with faith-based
charities already registered. Introduction to FSCU, CHARITY COMMISSION, supra
note 226.
208 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 12
2013] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND FINANCIAL WAR 209
sensibilities with Anglo-British traditions.254 The rationales of Amos and,
especially, Hosanna-Tabor, while both civil employment discrimination
cases, together suggest that something like an Abu Hamza removal order,
even in the context of a criminal proceeding, would face a steep uphill
battle in the United States.255
C. Zero-Sum Logics ofNon-Establishment and the War on Terror
A number of scholars have recently argued that American
counterterrorism policy risks brushing up against the Establishment
Clause where that policy seeks to officially mold Muslim public opinion
and "speech" at home and abroad according to a moderate, anti-
256radicalization paradigm. Tracing the genealogy of this policy to a
British model known as the "Prevent" program, a prong of Britain's
counterterrorism policy that focuses on counter-radicalization, these
scholars cite the following developments as instances of what Samuel
Rascoff calls "official Islam." 2 57 Examples of "official Islam" include the
following: federal law enforcement officials who participate in
conference panels on the need to encourage a peaceful and "moderate"
form of Islam at home and abroad as a counterweight to violent Islamic
extremism; a recent report by the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs committee on the 2009 Fort Hood attack that
identifies certain strains of "political Islam" as a source of terrorist
violence; and the development by American officials overseeing the
detention of Iraqi prisoners of war of a "directory" juxtaposing
254. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (observing that
the founders sought to foreclose the English-style creation of a national church and
governmental control of ecclesiastical offices); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104-
14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the framers intended the
establishment clause to prevent the establishment of a national church and
preferences among religious sects or denominations).
255. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 327-28 (1987) (holding that an exemption
from employment anti-discrimination laws for religious institutions does not violate
the Establishment Clause even where the employee's duties are strictly secular in
nature).
256. See generally Rascoff, supra note 16; Huq, supra note 16.
257. See Rascoff, supra note 16, at 153-166.
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"moderate" and "radical" Koranic passages. In each of these examples,
the government is embracing a "preferred" form of Islam, thereby
clashing with an early modem tradition of opposition to government
control over the church that is embodied in our establishment clause.25 9
This is an important, if somewhat elusive, issue because it flags
the many unintended and implicit means by which the War on Terror has
contributed to underenforcement of the constitutional norm against
establishment. But whether the phenomenon of "official Islam" entails an
Establishment Clause violation depends, in part, on whether the
government lacks a secular purpose for such counter-radicalization
efforts. Where the government's purpose is to protect Americans from
violent terrorist acts-and it is difficult to conceive of the federal
government having a different purpose in this domain-the fact that such
a secular purpose manifests itself in rhetoric with pronounced religious
implications does not suffice to make out an Establishment Clause
.. 260violation.
An analogy can be made to the religious symbol cases. In Lynch
v. Donnelly 261, the Supreme Court upheld public displays of religious
symbols, such as the creche, if the displays also annex a secular holiday
262
symbol, such as a reindeer. In that context, the Court said, the secular
elements and purpose of the display suffice to vitiate the establishment
concern.263 In the counterterrorism context, the government's compelling
interest in protecting national security fills the role served by the secular
258. See id.; John H. Mansfield, Promotion of Liberal Islam by the United
States, in ENEMY COMBATANTS, TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT LAW 85, 85
(David K. Linnan ed., 2008) see generally Huq, supra note 16; Aziz Z. Huq,
Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. L. & Soc. CHANGE 39 (2010).
259. Rascoff, supra note 16, at 187. Rascoff calls this early modem tradition
"anti-Erastianism," but that term is somewhat misused in this context if used to
describe a general opposition to a state-dominated church. The position of the
sixteenth-century Swiss theologian Thomas Erastus was more specific than this; he
proclaimed "that the final right to excommunicate sinners lay with the secular
magistrates, not the church authorities in a Genevan-type consistory." See DIARMAID
MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 355 (2003).
260. See Rascoff, supra note 16, at 143-47. Aware of this difficulty with his
argument, Rascoff suggests that his purpose is to identify a judicially under-enforced
constitutional norm.
261. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
262. Id. at 671-72, 687.
263. See id at 680.
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holiday trappings in the religious display cases. The counter-
radicalization policies described in the "Official Islam" literature, in
other words, implicate a judicially underenforced constitutional norm to
which only the Executive Branch can attend.264 By contrast, the removal
of an imam from a mosque would constitute a clearly litigable
Establishment Clause violation. But that scenario also suggests why free
exercise, and not simply anti-establishmentarianism (or anti-
Erastianism), is at issue in the contrasting approaches that the British and
American governments have taken to the post-9/11 Muslim charity
controversy.265
For the great irony in all of this is that, while effectively
foreclosing more restrained measures made available by the
establishment tradition, the American system of separation of church and
state permits and perhaps even encourages more drastic measures. A
constitutional culture that prides itself on permitting greater leeway to
religious institutions than establishment societies thereby forces itself
into a corner where seemingly zero-sum conflicts between
counterterrorism policy and religious liberty become unavoidable.266 You
may not remove the preacher from the church, no matter how egregious
his misdeeds or how far they depart from the spirit of the religious
organization and its faith, for that would conflict with the "hands off'
principle (among other religious liberty norms). But you can indict the
entire church hierarchy and even the church itself (if incorporated) in
order to punish and deter the problem caused by the errant or corrupt
pastor.
There are, of course, an infinite number of variations we can
think of along this spectrum of individual versus institutional
misconduct: the leadership or membership of a religious charity or house
of worship might be relatively more or relatively less "in cahoots" with
the bad apple. As discussed later in the Article, the Muslim American
264. See Rascoff, supra note 16 at 149; Huq, supra note 16, at 864-65
(arguing that church autonomy argument against use of religious signals unlikely to
command substantial respect from courts under current religion clause law).
265. Therefore, like Douglas Laycock, I am skeptical that the establishment
clause can provide an end run around Smith. See 2 LAYCOCK, supra note 135, at 320.
266. See infra Part IV.B. (considering a Catholic charitable variation on this
theme: the clash between religious liberty and the right of gays and lesbians to adopt
children).
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charity cases can be placed at different points along that spectrum,
though the indications that we have generally underestimated the degree
of internal conflict within these institutions are troubling. But the issue is
not simply these particular institutions. By the very nature of the
philanthropic enterprise, these institutions are embedded in larger webs
of charitable giving and service that, when made the target of criminal
investigation and public suspicion, can cast a shadow over the entire
Muslim American community (and, not incidentally, over Muslim
communities abroad). Meanwhile, the underlying dilemma remains:
there seems something dysfunctional about a legal culture that severely
restricts the ability to resort to targeted disciplinary measures but throws
the door open to all-encompassing punitive measures.
D. "Hands Off" Multiculturalism, and Anti-Discrimination in Britain
Nonetheless, that conflict is neither inherent in nor necessary to
the American law of religious liberty. Consider one additional
characteristic of English law in this regard: it too has a version of the
"hands off' principle. The Court of Appeals of the Chancery Division for
England and Wales recently had occasion to address this issue in a
dispute about the trusteeship and governance of two Sikh temples,
known as Gurdwaras and described as "religious charities" in the Court's
opinion.267 The dispute centered on whether one of the plaintiffs was the
spiritual leader of the Nirmal Sikhs and the successor to the First Holy
268Saint. If so, that status would entitle him to exercise a power conferred
by the trust deeds of the two Gurdwaras to remove the defendants as
trustees and replace them with his fellow plaintiffs.269 The lawyer for the
plaintiffs argued that, under the line of cases associated with Lord
Eldon's 1813 opinion in the Craigdallie case (the leading English case
on the resolution of church property disputes), English courts are
permitted to consider departures from the doctrines of the faith in
270deciding intra-church disputes. The Court of Appeals disagreed that
Craigdallie was apposite, distinguishing between civil property disputes
267. Khaira v. Shergill, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 983 (appeal taken from Eng.).
268. Idat [4].
269. Id
270. Id. at [59].
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and controversies over the truth of who is a "holy person and a spiritual
leader equipped with fundamental powers affecting the internal
,271
governance of a body of believers." In the latter context, a court is
clearly "being asked to pronounce on matters of religious doctrine and
practice."272
In fact, as Christopher McCrudden has shown, the "hands off'
principle dates back to early nineteenth-century English legal history. It
was a judicial response to the emancipation of Catholics and Jews, a
process begun in the eighteenth century that involved reducing and
removing traditional legal restrictions on these two groups. In that
context, "hands off' became, in the early nineteenth century, a way to
negotiate the conflicts that arose between Jews and Catholics, on the one
hand, and the dominant Protestant Christian denominations, on the other:
it served as a political settlement rather than a technical constitutional
requirement. Parliament remained free to, and did, intervene in inter- and
intra-religious disputes involving questions of faith and doctrine, and has
273
done so until the present day. (Hence the Charity Commission's
authority, delegated to it by parliamentary statute, to take the kinds of
actions described above in the religious charitable context). With the rise
of a multiculturalist approach to questions of religious diversity in
Britain beginning in the 1960s, English courts began to supplement this
earlier nineteenth-century tradition of accommodation with legislative
accommodations of ethno-cultural practices associated with the major
"new" ethnic groups residing in late and post-imperial Britain, including
274
sub-continental Muslim immigrants.
The twenty-first century has seen a post-multicultural turn in
Britain, and with it an increasing emphasis on seeing differences through
the eyes of religion rather than culture. With that emphasis has come an
271. Id. at [61]-[63].
272. Id. at [71].
273. McCrudden, supra note 227, at 202. As McCrudden puts it, "[i]n Britain,
the (normative) constitutional tradition has been seen as one of pragmatic
empiricism: if it works, it's constitutional." Id. For a discussion of the separation of
powers issues raised by Parliament's delegation of regulatory, enforcement, and
adjudicative authority to the Charity Commission, see Rohan Price & John Kong
Shan Ho, The Charity Commission of England and Wales as a Model: Could Hong
Kong and Australia be Importing a Constitutional Problem?, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 55, 55-75 (2012).
274. McCrudden, supra note 227, at 202.
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official encouragement of the contribution of faith communities to public
life (once again including Islam), and the growing strength of anti-
discrimination and human rights norms in British law, particularly
following the adoption of the Human Rights Act in 1998.275 The
emerging emphasis on an anti-discrimination norm has been felt even at
the level of the Charity Commission. Through its administrative tribunal,
the Commission ruled in 2008 that Catholic Care, a longstanding
religious charity, would not be permitted to amend its articles of
incorporation so as to bring it under a regulatory exemption to Britain's
2006 Equality Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
276orientation. Without that exemption, Catholic Care would have been
277
required to provide gays and lesbians access to its adoption services.
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision in 2010, holding that whether
Catholic Care was acting within the scope of the public interest
requirement of the Equality Act regulatory exemption should be
addressed by weighing the positive advantages conferred by the charity
against the disadvantage caused by discrimination.278 The Court thus
directed the Commission to consider whether Catholic Care should, by
that standard, be permitted to amend its articles so as to bring itself
279
within the exemption for faith-based institutions.
E. From "Hands Off" to Cy Pris in the United States?
Just how these developments will affect the relationship between
the British state and British Muslim charities remains to be seen. They
certainly suggest the possibility of greater direct conflict between
280
religious liberty and equality or anti-discrimination claims. But they
also highlight just how malleable, how subject to shifts in the larger
political culture, constitutional norms can be-not just in Britain, but on
this side of the Atlantic, where similar controversies involving Catholic
275. Id. at 203.
276. Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v. The Charity Comm'n for England &
Wales, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 520, [1] (appeal taken from Charity Tribunal).
277. Id. at [6].
278. Id. at [65]-[70].
279. Id. at [111]; JULIAN RIVERS, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED RELIGIONS:
BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENT AND SECULARISM 286-87 (2010).
280. See McCrudden, supra note 227, at 204-05.
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and other faith-based social service agencies and institutional employers
have been cropping up.281 In the collision between freedom of religion
and anti-discrimination law, the traditional "hands off' principle seems
increasingly antiquated, superseded by statutory exemptions on the one
hand, and by the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith (requiring free exercise
282
to bow before neutral rules of general applicability) on the other. The
American law of church and state still recognizes the "hands off'
principle, but is no longer nearly as beholden to that principle across a
wide range of contemporary religious liberty issues as it once was. This
is likely due in part to the rise of the religious right and conservative
283
political support for faith-based charities.
This analysis means that there may well be room "between the
joints" of free exercise and establishment for American federal courts or
agencies to tap into the spirit of the state courts' traditional cy pros
authority to intervene in the management of religious charities.284 While
the Charity Commission's removal power is simply too foreign to current
American ways of doing charitable supervision to be carried over, the
state cy pr~s cases suggest other measures-such as the award of
charitable assets to alternative classes of recipients, or an order to hold
new elections for the leadership of a charity-that can be taken to ensure
a charitable institution operates within the bounds of its declared
285intentions. The law governing reorganization of religious institutions
281. These cases are discussed further, infra, Part IV.B.
282. For more on Smith and antidiscrimination law, see generally Schragger,
supra note 124.
283. See WARDE, supra note 26, at 148-49 (summarizing the increase in
political support for faith-based charities in recent years).
284. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005).
285. See, e.g., Islamic Ctr. of Harrison, Inc. v. Islamic Sci. Found., Inc., 692
N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (upholding trial court order directing religious
corporations to hold reorganizational meeting for purposes of electing a new board
of trustees, as a remedy for plaintiffs' action to remove individual officers); In re
Kensington Hosp. for Women, 58 A.2d 154, 157 (Pa. 1948) (applying cy pr~s to
award assets of defunct nonsectarian hospital to a sectarian hospital); In re Hawley's
Estate, 223 N.Y.S.2d 803, (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1961) (applying cy pr~s to reform a will
providing for annual scholarship prizes to pupils in a Protestant Episcopal school so
as to remove requirements that recipients be communicants in Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States and be sons of native-born American citizens).
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in bankruptcy might suggest yet another model. 2 86 There will be
situations in which these models conflict with establishment or free
exercise norms.2 And there are indications that British counterterrorism
policies, including in the charitable sector, have accentuated divisions
within the Muslim-British community itself, as well as between Muslim
and non-Muslim Britons. A sense that the British government is picking
and choosing its preferred leaders for domestic Muslim communities is a
288
key factor in that perception. This is a serious concern. But there will
286. See Ryan J. Donohue, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Reorganize: Sacraments
for Sale, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 293, 321 (2005) ("[T]he heavy judicial
supervision required in a reorganization case is easily characterized as the type of
government intrusion into religious affairs that the Establishment clause was
designed to protect against.").
287. See, e.g., Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Wisan, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1232-34 (2011), vacated & remanded, 698 F.3d 1295
(10th Cir. 2012) (holding that a state trial court's effort to reform a religious trust
without regard to religion impermissibly entangled the court with religion; injunction
was later overturned); Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). In Young, the Eighth Circuit held that
RFRA barred a bankruptcy trustee from recovering the funds some debtors had
contributed as tithes to the church during the year preceding the filing of their
petition for bankruptcy. Young, 82 F.3d at 1420. The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), which struck down RFRA's application to the states as exceeding Congress's
enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
288. See MARC McGOVERN & ANGELA TOBIN, COUNTERING TERROR OR
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE? COMPARING IRISH AND BRITISH MUSLIM EXPERIENCES OF
COUNTER-INSURGENCY LAW AND POLICY 29 (2009), available at
http://www.ihrc.org.uk/attachments/9384_counteringterrororcounterproductive.pdf.
McGovern writes that Muslim participants in this symposium reported that they
regarded as:
[a] core aim of [British counter-radicalization policies] Contest
2 and Prevent to 'not only define Islam for us, but to choose
and select our leaders'. A number of instances of attempts to
replace or oust community leaders on the grounds of a
'supposed radical background' were discussed, including that
of Doctor Daud Abdullah of the Muslim Council of Britain.
The state aim of focusing funding on certain kinds of Islamic
groups was regarded by some participants as accentuating
divisions not only in the community but within the faith group
as such . . . . The identification of mosques and imams as
supposed key agents of radicalization was also viewed as an
erroneous attempt to frame an understanding of issues in order
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inevitably be some form of tension between a more targeted approach to
the investigation of religious institutions and countervailing autonomy
289concerns.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS LBI3ERTY
It is becoming increasingly clear that, even in the area of
religious liberty, the war on terror is spilling over its emergency
boundaries, seeping into neighboring areas of law, and becoming
290
normalized. Yet exactly how it does this is not always apparent. The
Muslim charity cases can help us to see how, for they dramatize the
relationship between religious liberty law and neighboring forms of
constitutional protection.
A. Religious Liberty and the War on Terror
Like the law of equal protection, First Amendment law does not
recognize claims based upon disparate impact.291 And unlike the law of
free speech, free exercise law does not recognize a chilling effect
doctrine for purposes of establishing standing. This means that
to legitimize the vetting of community funding (i.e. through
the Charities Commission given the charitable status of most
mosques).
Id. at 29. For more on the "Contest 2" and "Prevent" policies, see also Huq,
Modeling Terrorism Radicalization, supra note 259, at 62; and Rascoff, supra note
16.
289. This is to say nothing of the range of devices that are available in white-
collar criminal law cases to avert indictment and prosecution of corporations. See
Ghachem, supra note 16, at 62. Federal and state prosecutors have resorted to civil
settlements rather than criminal sanctions even as to several prominent global banks
suspected of funneling billions of dollars through their American branches to Iran
and other sanctioned nations. See Mark Scott, Shares of Standard Chartered Slide
Amid Money Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at B4; Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Prosecutors Link Money from China to Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012,
at B1; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulator Says British Bank Helped Iran Hide
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at Al.
290. See Daniel Gordon & Malick W. Ghachem, From Emergency Law to
Legal Process: Herbert Wechsler and the Second World War, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 333, 377-81 (2007); supra note 128 and accompanying text.
291. Marshall, supra note 145, at 1946.
enforcement actions that penalize both legal and illegal religious conduct
and speech-and the Muslim American charity cases clearly do this, if
they accomplish nothing else 292-are effectively immune from challenge
in a material support context. Under current law, the concern that
counterterrorism policy has dampened Muslim charitable giving on the
fundraising or operational levels could only be addressed through
individual suits brought by donors or recipients, not through challenges
293by designated institutions and their officers. And, not surprisingly, few
individual donors or recipients have found it worth their while to bring
such a case, a step that would itself aggravate the stigmatization problem
such a lawsuit would be used to check.
But even a relaxation of the standing rules of religious liberty
law, or a recognition that disparate impact theory is sometimes the only
way to address systemic racial and religious discrimination, might not
have much impact in this area. First, as we have seen, the anecdotal
information suggests that there has been a rebound in Muslim American
charitable activity over the course of the second half of the Terror
Decade. That seems to be true at least on the fundraising and expenditure
side, while the operational and receiving sides of international
humanitarian activity in conflict zones important to Muslims seem to be
facing continued challenges.294 Second, even in a world of relaxed
standing and cognizance of chilling effects, it will remain very easy for
courts to say that "there is no free exercise right to fund terrorists 295in
politically very unpopular cases.
292. Cf WARDE, supra note 26, at 130.
293. This is the problem identified by the district court in the IARA civil case,
and disregarded by the D.C. Circuit (which chose to rule on other grounds). Islamic
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Islamic Am.
Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d. 34, 54-55 (D.D.C.
2005); see also Kathyrn A. Ruff, Scared to Donate: An Examination of the Effects of
Designating Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment
Rights of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 482-93 (2006)
(outlining and evaluating the constitutional claims of a hypothetical class of Muslim
donor plaintiffs in a case involving the designation of a Muslim charity as a terrorist
organization, and concluding that the claims are unlikely to prevail).
294. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text; Benthall, supra note 82
(suggesting the impact on the operational and receiving side of Muslim charities).
295. See supra note 139.
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So long as the nexus between religious liberty and charity
remains framed in those terms, it is naive to suppose that the United
States can retreat from the material support road down which it has been
going and set things on a fundamentally different track. Muslim
American religious liberty in the free exercise sense is in retreat today in
a way that bears a passing resemblance to the way that church autonomy
is in retreat in the Catholic clergy sex abuse context. Douglas Laycock,
whose early law review articles helped to put the doctrine of church
autonomy on the scholarly map, has observed that in the tort cases that
followed the revelations out of Boston in 2002, church authorities put
forward institutional autonomy arguments that were too absolute. The
"all or nothing" nature of these defenses implied that a civil court simply
could not inquire into what a church was doing to control abusive clergy,
no matter how egregious the pattern of behavior. He nonetheless
concludes that, even in this highly charged context, there is a role for
church autonomy defenses where the plaintiffs' theories of institutional
296
liability for the conduct of individual priests are highly attenuated.
Currently, no court or scholar has suggested that the law of
religious institutional autonomy is relevant to the crackdown on Muslim
American charities and other institutions.297 This silence is itself
significant, revealing that the law of "church autonomy" is not quite as
universal in its application as it purports to be. But church autonomy
would not have much traction in the Muslim charitable context: there is
almost certainly no end run around the limitations of free exercise law to
be found here, anymore than there is in the law of the Establishment
Clause. One reason is the association of the church autonomy doctrine
298
with the clergy sex abuse context. Another is that any arguments from
institutional autonomy in the material support context are likely to
296. 2 LAYCOCK, supra note 135, at 331-32.
297. The closest is Huq, supra note 16, but his argument did not involve the
charity cases, rather the general use of religious speech as indicators of incipient
terrorist activity. Id. at 833. Moreover, Huq concedes that, as a doctrinal matter,
church autonomy claims are at best merely instructive in this context, lacking any
real traction owing to the post-Smith drift of religious liberty law. Id. at 860-64.
298. Marci Hamilton has been the most prominent of church-state scholars
seeking to discredit the church autonomy doctrine for its alleged role in facilitating
the clergy sex abuse crisis. See generally MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL
(2005). Her very personal feud with Laycock is reflected in 2 LAYCOCK, supra note
135, at 325-28.
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produce a mere variant of what the courts have already held: "there is no
right based on church autonomy to subsidize terrorists."2 99
The implications of this are potentially dramatic. The law of
religious liberty has only so many branches in the United States: free
exercise (and RFRA), conscientious objection, non-establishment, and
church autonomy describe the pool of available claims. If none of those
doctrines has traction in the Muslim charity context, it means that the law
has effectively concluded that religious freedom is not salient to this area
at the intersection of faith and counterterrorism policy. In itself, this
would not be unprecedented. The Supreme Court has deemed certain
areas of government regulation-securities regulation and antitrust, for
example-to lie beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment. 3 00 But it
is one thing to conclude that these forms of regulation lack
44 301"constitutional salience." in Frederick Schauer's phrase. It would be a
far more radical and dangerous step to say that the Muslim American
charity cases also lack constitutional salience, at least where the law of
material support is involved (and it is involved across a very wide range
of this philanthropic sector). The Muslim charity cases are not the only
area of the war on terror to demonstrate that, in a democracy, "respect for
the individual is very quickly submerged to the common good . .. when
terrorism threatens national security.,302 But charity is at the center of
many of the world's religions, and also critical to the development of the
contemporary law of religious liberty. The status quo should strike
supporters of religious liberty as unsatisfactory at best.
I have already suggested one possibility: make greater use of the
scalpel303 where possible, as the British experience suggests. 304 This tool
will conflict with American free exercise values at times, and there will
be situations where-the target of an investigation having failed to
responsibly make its own use of the scalpel-it is necessary to bring
299. See supra notes 137-39.
300. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765
(2004).
301. Id.
302. NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
DISSENTING PROTESTANTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 161 (2012).
303. See supra notes 35-36.
304. See supra Part Ill.E., Ghachem, supra note 16, at 65-66.
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down the sledgehammer. But that muddled state of affairs is preferable to
an exclusive reliance upon the sweeping material support of terrorism
machinery.
That machinery harms our values because it implicates lawful as
well as illegal forms of Muslim belief and conduct, unduly narrowing our
religious and political discourse. The Oklahoma constitutional
amendment to ban recognition of Islamic law, and the effort to impede
the construction of a mosque in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, are the easy
cases, in which the impairment of free exercise is driven by transparently
anti-Muslim bias within the terms of the Court's reasoning in the case of
305
Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. These are
effectively blips on the constitutional radar screen, destined to fade as
people tune into and then out of the conservative talk radio and television
shows that sustain them. The Muslim charity cases, by contrast, pose a
much harder problem, one that cannot be solved by a simple balancing of
liberty against security. Risk-free choices are not available in this area
because Muslim American willingness to cooperate with
counterterrorism investigations appears tied to that community's
perceptions of the neutrality and procedural justice of law
306
enforcement. Given that this is the case, it makes sense to make the
hard choices with an informed sense of what it is we are trying to secure,
which includes a society in which religious liberty is fully implemented
for all groups: the politically unpopular as well as the majority faiths.
More than one vision of religious liberty can describe such a
society, but one characteristic that all these visions should share is a
mechanism for counteracting the pressure towards internalized
surveillance that unpopular religious minorities experience. 30 7 "They
have to watch themselves and hesitate, asking whether they are doing
305. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524
(1993) (finding that a new city ordinance aimed at prohibiting animal sacrifice was
neither neutral nor generally applicable because the law targeted a specific religious
group).
306. See COLE, supra note 26, at 189-97; see generally Tom Tyler et al.,
Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study of
Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 365 (2012) (considering "the
circumstances under which members of the Muslim American community
voluntarily cooperate with police efforts to combat terrorism").
307. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE:
OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 220-21 (2012).
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everything in their power so as not to give offense. For majorities, by
contrast, the world is made in their image . . . : the general shape of
public culture expresses their sense of life . . . . [T]hey define what
'normal' is."308 That phenomenon has a very large reach given the
pluralism of contemporary American society. But the crackdown on
Muslim American charity has created an especially troubling variation
on this theme, by effectively branding as taboo certain expressions of
Muslim religiosity because of both their real and supposed connections
to actual terrorist activity. The politics of "jihad" and the support of
orphans have become loaded categories in the aftermath of cases like
Holy Land Foundation.30 9 So too have the very image of Muslim
Americans paying over zakat funds to a mosque or an overseas
institution, not to mention the figure of the solitary male Muslim
volunteer traveling through Afghanistan or Pakistan, or the common
expression "Allahu Akbar" ("God is Great"), or even the phenomenon of
Muslims praying collectively in an airport. All of these have acquired a
sinister and absolutist character in American public discourse. 3 10 And
many of these terms and images have acquired that suspect character in
connection with the crackdown on Muslim American charity.
Unlike British and continental law, American counterterrorism
law does not expressly criminalize language that tends to support
terrorism, barring an incitement to imminent lawless action. American
material support laws are protective of free expression and broadly
content-neutral in that comparative sense.3' 1 But, as even the Supreme
Court majority opinion acknowledges in Humanitarian Law Project,
those laws are not exactly content-neutral: they do limit the ability of a
speaker to engage with an organization based on the nature of the speech
and the identity of the organization. Moreover, as we have seen, the law
308. Id.
309. Laila Al-Marayati, a board member of Kindhearts, which focuses on
delivering aid to needy children, has stated that her charity does not inquire into how
the father of an orphan died in order to avoid charges that Kindhearts knowingly
supports the families of suicide bombers. See Watanabe, supra note 87.
310. See, e.g., Ramzi Kassem, From Altruists to Outlaws: The Criminalization
of Travelling Islamic Volunteers, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 85 (2011)
(discussing the conflation of positive Islamic charity work with the Islamic fighter).
311. See Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support
for Terrorism, and the Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC.
J. 1, 1-2 (2011).
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of evidence permits prosecutors in criminal cases to introduce all kinds
of evidence consisting of protected speech and perfectly innocent acts for
the purpose of proving criminal intent, or showing the elements of a
conspiracy. 312 These rules-and the kinds of trials they license-may not
seem problematic from a purely legal point of view, but they
communicate a certain message to the lay public in general and the
Muslim American lay public in particular. That message is: "Stay away
from this stuff; it is criminal in nature." The case of a Saudi graduate
student in computer science at the University of Idaho-prosecuted for
material support on the grounds that he funneled money to Islamic
charities with ties to terrorists-relied on the defendant's work in
maintaining web sites and an email discussion list that prominently
featured the concept ofjihad. 13 The prosecution of a Massachusetts man
named Tarek Mehanna for material support was based in significant part
on his role in translating an Arabic document entitled "39 Ways to Serve
and Participate in Jihad" and helping to distribute it online.314 The cases
described in this Article, and others not analyzed here, are replete with
similar examples.
In the 1960s and 1970s, one of the major challenges facing
Nation of Islam prison inmates bringing religious liberty claims was to
persuade the courts that the Nation of Islam was indeed a religion that
qualified for the protections of the Free Exercise Clause and not an
oppositional political movement or black radical cult. With a few notable
exceptions, Muslim Americans no longer face that problem today as a
matter of law.. But the cases sometimes treat Islamic religious concepts
as a form of "religionized politics" rather than "real" religion: they are
312. Under standard conspiracy law, an overt act need not be an illegal act.
People v. Johnson, 159 Ca. Rptr. 3d 70, 77 (Cal. 2013)
313. Timothy Egan, Computer Student on Trial Over Muslim Web Site Work,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/27/us/computer-
student-on-trial-over-muslim-web-site-work.html; Harvey Silverglate, Free Speech
in an Age of Terror, BOSTON GLOBE (June 28, 2004), http://www.boston.com .
/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/articles/2004/06/28/free speech inanageof t
error/. The defendant, Sami Al-Husayen, was prosecuted under the "expert guidance
or assistance" provision of the material support statute. See Egan, Computer Student
on Trial Over Muslim Web Site Work.
314. See David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS
(Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-
ways-limit-free-speech/.
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perceived as ideological exhortations signaling terrorist activity rather
than the contested legacies of an Abrahamic faith undergoing rapid and
315
profound transformations.
The suppression of this religious discourse and internal contest is
one of the major hidden costs of the financial war on terror, and
particularly its charitable front. That cost could well be measured in free
speech terms, and indeed it is a classic example of the kind of injury to
the "marketplace of ideas" that Holmes and other free speech champions
of the early twentieth century decried. But the tendency to see it only
under that rubric is, in a sense, part of the problem. The "militant"
rhetoric of jihad has become a form of religious dissent, and religious
dissent has a special place in the genesis and culture of the First
317
Amendment. To counteract the suppression of radical (and not so
radical) Islamic religious expression, and the pressures towards
internalized surveillance that it produces for some Muslim Americans,
will require moving beyond the "good Muslim/bad Muslim" dynamic as
a condition of admission to the "normal" 318 American religious
landscape.319 And that, in turn, will mean pushing back against an
315. For the distinction between "religion" and "religionized politics," see
Samuel Helfont, Term Warfare, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 11, 2012),
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/islamism-islam-bassam-tibi. For indications that
the challenge overcome by Nation of Islam inmates remains a live legal problem at
some level, see Camp Retreats Found., Inc. v. Twp. of Marathan, No. 304179, 2012
WL 1698379, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App., May 15, 2012) (unpublished) (reversing tax
tribunal's denial of a charitable exemption from ad valorem taxation for a Muslim
organization's use of a summer camp site, where the tribunal had concluded that the
camp did not meet the definition of a (religious) charity); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Estes v. Rutherford Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n, No. IOCV-
1443 (Ch. Ct. Rutherford Cnty. Oct. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/murfreesboro amicus 10-18-1 0.pdf
(arguing, in response to plaintiffs' suggestions to the contrary, that Islam is a religion
and a mosque a place of religious assembly).
316. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 135-233 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 2004); Barak-Erez & Scharia, supra note 311.
317. See MILLER, supra note 302.
318. NUSSBAUM, supra note 307, at 220-21.
319. Cf Alia Malek, Introduction, in PATRIOT ACTS, supra note 186, at 19
("While the injustices, counted individually, can sometimes seem minor, in the
aggregate, they suggest that some religions and ethnicities (the lines of which are
often blurred and difficult to define) inherently cannot be American.").
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ongoing tendency to assimilate problems of free exercise and religious
observance at their core into a framework of free speech and fungibility.
This task is all the more urgent since it is clear that free speech
doctrine itself is subject to highly variegated restrictions or protections,
depending (1) on whether it is tied to the concept of fungibility and, more
generally, (2) on the politics of the individual Justices. To take one very
notable recent example, the Court in Citizens United did not actually
deny that campaign contributions are easily converted into political
320
influence and corruption. It simply held that, for First Amendment
purposes, these concerns about the ultimate purchases of political money
are not sufficiently weighty to justify the restriction on political speech
(unless a "Super-Pac" directly engages in coordinated advocacy of a
political candidate).321 This is so even though the legislative history for
the statute challenged in Citizens United reflects a congressional
determination that the undue influence of wealthy campaign contributors
is a serious and compelling problem in American politics today, just as
the legislative history of the AEDPA and PATRIOT acts reflects a
congressional finding that the need to prevent legitimate monies from
322
getting into the hands of terrorists is a vital matter of national security.
We need not conclude that Citizens United was wrongly decided in order
to see that free speech doctrine cannot be relied on to deal with the
specifically religious stakes of the conflict between national security and
323
religious expression in this new era.
320. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
321. See id. at 356-57, 360.
322. For a provocative comparison of Citizens United and Humanitarian Law
Project cases, see generally Aziz Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves
and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012), available at http://ssm.com
/abstract=1984948.
323. The notion that a "hybrid rights" theory under Smith might fare better
than either free speech or free exercise alone is not persuasive. Smith itself is not the
governing standard in these federal cases. And in any event, as Justice Souter
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Lukumi Babalu, "if a hybrid claim is simply
one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule." Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993). Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have provided little support for hybrid
rights claims in the years since Smith. But for a contrary argument that would rely on
a hybrid rights approach, see generally Murad Hussein, Defending the Faithful, 117
YALE L.J. 920 (2008), and the critiques of Hussein's argument by R. Richard Banks,
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Moreover, even if free exercise law is best seen today as a
reflection of equal protection and anti-discrimination norms rather than
the desire to protect religious observance,3 24 that still leaves much work
for the courts to do on the religious liberty front in the post-9/11 era. In
October 2001, American counterterrorism officials met with their
counterparts in the United Arab Emirates to discuss strategies for
keeping track of the informal banking networks (known as hawalas) that
are used in some Muslim majority countries to transfer monies. The
American officials in attendance reportedly tried to ease local concerns
that the United States was singling out Muslim and Arab groups in its
post-9/11 crackdown on Muslim charities by noting examples of how
Roman Catholic charities had been prosecuted for funneling money to
the Irish Republican Army during the period of "the Troubles"
(extending from the 1960s to 1998).325 These purported prosecutions do
not appear to have taken place. In 1981, the Attorney General did bring a
civil action against the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID, a
501(c)(3)) to enjoin the group from violating the provisions of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. But no criminal case was
brought, and no other Catholic charitable entities seem to have been
pursued in connection with the financing of IRA terrorism.326 This
Group Harms in Antiterrorism Efforts: A Pervasive Problem with No Simple
Solution, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 198 (2008), and Bernadette Meyler, Religious
Expression in the Balance: A Response to Murad Hussain's Defending the Faithful,
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 186 (2007).
324. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673, 673-78 (2002).
325. Jeff Gerth & Judith Miller, U.S. Makes Inroads in Isolating Funds of
Terror Groups, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
11/05/world/nation-challenged-money-trail-us-makes-inroads-isolating-funds-terror-
groups.html.
326. Att'y Gen. of U. S. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241, 245
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1981). See also Benthall, supra note 82, at 116; Kevin Cullen,
The IRA & Sinn Fein: America and the Conflict. PBS FRONTLINE
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/reports/america.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013). Cullen describes the ubiquity of informal Irish-American
fundraising efforts for the IRA at various moments during the Troubles, but notes
that these efforts paled in comparison to the millions raised by mainstream charities
like the American Ireland Fund. Although the monies raised by those charities
apparently included contributions for weapons (if not weapons in kind), Cullen
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comparison is significant not only because it was invoked (albeit in an
apparently misleading way) by American counterterrorism officials, but
also because the Catholic American experience has been so central to the
development of American church-state law and such an important source
of understanding how religious minorities can overcome stigmatization
and marginalization to achieve integration.327 It is vital that our law
enforcement actions not convey the impression (let alone partake of the
reality) of selective enforcement. Yet an important percentage of the
Muslim American community appears to believe that this is what is
happening with the application of material support, immigration, and
anti-fraud laws post 9/11, as well as police and FBI surveillance
practices.32 8
B. Beyond Islam and the War on Terror
At the same time, the Muslim American charity cases matter
because they will continue to bear on the situation of other religious
groups, on nonprofit organizations generally, and on the delivery of
professional services.329 The religious and religious liberty-related
organizations that filed an amic curiae brief with the Fifth Circuit in the
HLF criminal appeal included the American Friends Service Committee
(a Quaker entity), Christian Peacemaker Teams, the Rutherford Institute,
and the Tikva Grassroots Empowerment Fund. Nonprofit amici included
Atlantic Philanthropies, the Council on Foundations, Grantmakers
without Borders, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and others. Many of
these same entities also filed as amici in the Humanitarian Law Project,
where they were joined by a unit of the University of Notre Dame and
concludes that the extent of Irish-American support for IRA paramilitary actions has
been overestimated.
327. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 191-92
(2002); SCHULTZ, supra note 22.
328. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 11, at 73; Sahar F. Aziz,
Countering Religion or Terrorism: Selective Enforcement of Material Support Laws
against Muslim Charities, 47 INST. FOR Soc. POL'Y & UNDERSTANDING: POL'Y
BRIEF 1, 2, 6-7 (2011), available at http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU Policy%
20Brief47AzizWEB.pdf.
329. Cf Erica Caple James, Governing Gifts: Law, Risk, and the "War on
Terror, " 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 65, 84 (2011).
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the International Crisis Group.3 30 As these briefs suggest, fungibility
might well become the vehicle by which the government manages,
directly or indirectly, to exert a very broad regulatory authority over the
faith-based and secular humanitarian aid sectors alike.
The post-9/11 controversies-concerning private foundations
placing conditions on grants to human rights organizations based on the
recipients' willingness to disclaim any ties to terrorist groups-are an
early indication of the kinds of indirect pressures that fungibility is
bringing to bear on the work of civil society. The Ford Foundation, for
example, has required grantees to sign a document stating that "you
agree that your organization will not promote or engage in violence,
terrorism, bigotry or the destruction of any state, nor will it make
subgrants to any entity that engages in these activities." Ford was
apparently driven to include this language in its grants after lawmakers in
Washington were asked to examine its tax-exempt status in connection
with grants to a Palestinian nongovernmental organization.33 1 The
foundation has been involved in a similar controversy involving the
ACLU.332 Not even the traditionally privileged work of lawyering is
immune from the reach of the fungibility doctrine, as then Solicitor
General Kagan made clear in the course of her oral argument in the
Humanitarian Law Project case, pointing out that an attorney who files a
brief at the behest of a designated organization can be prosecuted for
material support of terrorism on that basis alone.33 3 That defense lawyers
have been increasingly implicated in representations of clients charged
with terrorism-related offenses shows that this prospect is not merely
abstract. If these and other developments come to pass, they would have
implications for the future of the First Amendment as a whole, and not
just religious liberty.
330. Brief for Am. Friends Serv. Comm. et al. as Amici Curiae supporting
Respondents, United States v. El-Mezain et al., 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011); see
also Aziz, supra note 328, at 5.
331. See Scott Sherman, Giving, With Strings Attached: The Ford Foundation
Needs to Stop Putting Controversial Conditions on Its Grants, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2007, at M4.
332. WENDY KAMINER, WORST INSTINCTS: COWARDICE, CONFORMITY, AND
THE ACLU 35, 66-78 (2010).
333. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 64.
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The implications of the crackdown on charities for religious
liberty issues beyond the war on terror increasingly come into focus. I
will briefly consider three such issues or perspectives, beginning with the
relationship between "politics" and "charity" or "religion." Since well
before 9/11, it has been a requirement of federal law that secular and
religious tax-exempt institutions (including churches and other houses of
worship) not engaged in direct campaigning on behalf of a political
candidate.334 That legislative provision-the so-called charitable gag
rule-was introduced by then Senator Lyndon Johnson in 1954, as part
of a politically opportunistic effort to ensure his reelection to the
Senate.335 Although it is not altogether clear that Johnson intended the
rule to apply to houses of worship, the rule flew in the face of a very long
American tradition, dating back to the colonial period, of clerics using
the pulpit to opine on any number of pressing public policy issues,
336including political campaigns.
The Terror Decade's revival of the government's powers to
police the boundary between "charitable" or "religious" activity and all
else has been reflected not only in the Muslim charity cases, but in
contemporaneous efforts to sanction churches and nonprofit
organizations generally for involvement in political campaigns.337 It is no
accident that this increasingly assertive engagement of 501(c)(3) entities,
ranging from evangelical churches to the NAACP, has been prompted on
so-many levels by the highly polarized character of post-9/11 American
national and cultural politics. The courts have thus far resisted pressures
to revisit the constitutionality of the gag rule since the D.C. Circuit
effectively settled that question in 2000.338 But new court challenges are
334. 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
335. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE
PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 11, 72, 110 (2011).
336. Id. at 110.
337. In September 2002, a federal judge in Illinois dismissed a criminal
indictment against the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and its CEO that
charged the defendants with falsely stating as follows: "BIF is required to maintain
the donations of zakat in a non-interest bearing account and to use those funds only
to assist the poor and needy. BIF abides strictly by those requirements." United
States v. Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc., No. 02 CR 414, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17223, at *5 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 13, 2002) (quoting from the indictment).
338. See generally Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding that revocation of a church's tax exempt status for intervening in a
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underway, and there have been calls for Congress to take action on its
own, at least by permitting the kinds of political speech most relevant to
the religious missions of churches and other institutions of worship.339
Any such effort to loosen the restriction on "political" activity will
necessarily take place against the backdrop of the federal government's
vastly expanded counterterrorism powers to define, on pain of criminal
sanction, what tax-exempt organizations can and cannot do under the
rubric of "charitable" activity. The very definition of what "charity" and
"religion" are or can be-their cultural and political boundaries-is in
play.
This contest over the limits of the religious sphere is also at work
in a second controversy still working its way through the federal courts:
the Catholic Church's steadfast opposition to a provision of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) that requires all employees, except a limited
class of religious institutions, to cover prescription contraceptives for
their employees. A state law version of this same requirement was
upheld by the California Supreme Court in 2004 in a case brought by
Catholic Charities of Sacramento.340 The current challenges to the ACA,
brought by various branches of Catholic Charities, the Catholic diocesan
authorities, and other arms of the Catholic Church, plead the full range of
religious liberty claims, from church autonomy to RFRA, constitutional
free exercise, and conscientious objection. Their common themes are
twofold: (1) the ACA forces Catholic institutions to engage in conduct
that they regard as incompatible with some of the central values of
Catholicism; and (2) the Catholic "Church" includes not merely the
diocesan church authorities that are the most visible expression of
Catholicism, but also Catholic schools, employers, charities, and so
forth.34 1
political campaign did not violate the church's right to freely exercise its religion,
and that the revocation of the church's tax exempt status was not selective
prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
339. CRIMM & WINER, supra note 335, at 366.
340. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 73-74
(Cal. 2004).
341. Cf Testimony of John Garvey, President of Catholic University of
America, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://publicaffairs.cua.edu
/releases/2012/garvey-hhs-remarks.cfm.
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In response to the Catholic outcry, the Obama administration in
2013 issued a regulation that broadened the scope of the exemption. 34 2
Meanwhile, the federal courts have issued conflicting decisions on
availability of preliminary injunctive relief under RFRA for private
corporations seeking to evade the ACA mandate. In one of the earlier
decisions, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed for
lack of standing and ripeness after the Department of Health and Human
Services announced a one-year enforcement safe harbor for non-profit
groups whose religious beliefs are violated by the mandate.343 The
Seventh Circuit recently heard oral argument in an appeal from a district
court decision that found no likelihood of success on the RFRA merits. 34 4
By contrast, an en banc panel of the Tenth Circuit has preliminary
enjoined enforcement of the mandate, with five of eight judges holding
that private corporations have free exercise rights.34 5 And a federal
district judge in Colorado issued preliminary injunctive relief while
finding that among the questions of first impression presented was: "Can
a corporation exercise religion?"34 6
The parallels between this controversy and the Muslim charity
cases can be analyzed at several different levels. For one, the issue of a
corporation's ability to "exercise religion," far from being an issue of
first impression in the federal courts, was foreshadowed in its rough
outlines by the HLF civil case, as we have seen. 347 The District Court for
the District of Columbia found that HLF could not plead a religious
freedom cause of action because, having described itself as a nonprofit
charitable corporation-it had failed to establish that its conduct could
342. Robert Pear, Birth Control Rule Altered to Allay Religious Objections,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, at Al, A3.
343. Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D.D.C. 2012).
344. Howard Friedman, 7th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments in 2 Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate Cases, RELIGION CLAUSE BLOG (May 23, 2013),
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2013/05/7th-circuit-hears-oral-arguments-in-
2.html. The Seventh Circuit has preliminary enjoined enforcement of the ACA
mandate pending appeal. Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5
(7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
345. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2013 WL 3216103,
at *1-2 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013).
346. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012).
347. See supra Part Ill.A.
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involve the exercise of religion. 3 4 8 Moreover, the ACA conscientious
objection cases and the Muslim charity cases raise overlapping questions
about the scope of governmental power over religious organizations.
There is surely some distance between preventing religious entities from
engaging in conduct they wish to undertake at the risk of severe criminal
penalties, and requiring those organizations to actively participate in
schemes inconsistent with their core religious beliefs. But the former
undoubtedly makes the latter seem more within the pale, and that should
come as little surprise. It was the rise of the administrative state around
the middle of the twentieth century that gave rise to so many of the
conflicts that have fueled the modem American law of religious liberty,
including debates over the legitimacy of religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws. 349
We need not believe that the Catholic Church has the better of
this legal or policy argument. However, in order to recognize that the two
phenomena-posing barriers to religiously-mandated conduct and
requiring conduct violative of religious conscience-may be related at
the level of the government's continually expanding administrative
powers, whether in the field of national security or health care. There are
two other parallels between the Muslim charity cases and Catholic
charitable controversies to which we should attend. One is that there are
ways of moderating the apparent head-on clash between religious liberty
and progressive social policy. The Obama administration has belatedly
figured this out, with its proposal to require insurance companies of
religious employers (rather than the employers themselves) to pay for the
contraceptive coverage. The Catholic Church has rejected this
compromise (or scalpel-like350 measure), but that does not mean it entails
an infringement of religious liberty. It is unfortunate that a similar
compromise was unavailable in 2006 to prevent Catholic Charities of
Boston from abandoning its child adoption services altogether, rather
348. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 83
(D.D.C. 2002).
349. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J. L. &
RELIGION 139, 140 (2009).
350. See supra text at notes 35-37.
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than comply with a Massachusetts state regulation that would have
required it to extend its services to gay and lesbian clients.35 '
Second, and on that last note, the charitable controversies of the
Terror Decade remind us that charity cannot be conceptualized in
isolation from its clients and recipients. The religious liberty interest
belongs both to the charitable givers of sustenance-in both Muslim and
Catholic contexts, often an organization-and to the needy who receive
that sustenance. The shortcomings of post-9/11 First Amendment law in
protecting the interests of the latter group should make us sensitive to
how the concerns of Catholic charities' benefactors are framed in the
current legal disputes. In both the contraceptive coverage and same-sex
adoption contexts, the religious liberty interest appears to be aligned with
the Church and not with its employees or benefactors. Such a mapping of
religious liberty however, represents an artificially narrow understanding
of just whose exercise of religion is at stake. Surely it is the actual giving
of charity that First Amendment law seeks to protect, and not simply the
claim of a religious or charitable organization to the status of giver. The
interests of gay and lesbian prospective parents, foster children, and even
to some extent the employees of the Catholic Church-all of these are
part of what it should mean to protect religious liberty in the Terror
Decade.
CONCLUSION
As the administrative-homeland security state of the early
twenty-first century continues to grow, so too will the potential for
351. See Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic
Charities of Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious
Freedom, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 297, 297-98 (2008). In the early 1990s, a
related controversy broke out over the firing of a Catholic Charities staff member
who supplied homeless women with condoms in the 1990s, pursuant to a
Massachusetts state mandate that human service providers receiving state funds
provide some form of AIDS education. Because state law in that case did not require
the actual distribution of condoms, a constitutional showdown could be averted. See
Peter Canellos, Firing Brings up Thorny Issues of Church and State, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1991, at 1. For a study of how these church-state conflicts impact
the provision of social services in the Archdiocese of Boston, see ERICA CAPLE
JAMES, THE CHURCH, THE CHARITY, AND THE HAITIAN CENTER: CORPORATE
CATHOLICISM IN BOSTON (forthcoming).
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conflicts between one form of right and another, along the lines of those
just described. The lessons of the Muslim charity cases cannot resolve
these thorny problems, but they can at least suggest ways of thinking
constructively about them.
This Article's final point about what has happened to religious
liberty in the Terror Decade has to do with how legal and religion
scholarship strike a balance between the general and the particular. The
leading general theories of religious liberty jurisprudence, such as Equal
Liberty or Substantive Neutrality (or, for that matter, any other kind of
neutrality)32 leave something to be desired in this context because they
never quite roll up their sleeves and get their hands dirty with the "nitty
gritty" encounters between counterterrorism and religious observance.
And theory tends to give only lip service to history, which can help us to
fully understand what is happening in the cases discussed in this article.
The situation of Muslim America today is both similar to and
different from other religious and non-religious groups now and in the
past, whether we are describing the experience of Catholics, Jews,
Japanese Americans, adherents of the Nation of Islam, or others. The
example of the integration of Catholics and Jews in the United States
from the 1920s onward-the making of so-called "Tri-Faith America"
("Protestant-Christian-Jew," in the title of Will Herberg's famous 1955
essay) -is instructive. That idea depended crucially on the interfaith
conciliation efforts of religious activists representing all three groups.
Initially working independently of government action, the National
Conference of Christians and Jews helped to promote a unified front of
American religious leaders against the specter of fascism emanating from
interwar Europe. Those efforts, which focused on highlighting the
dangers of religious persecution and the need for tolerance and goodwill,
in turn received the support of the military leadership during the Second
World War. The legacies of organizations like the National Conference
of Christians and Jews were subsequently reflected in law, as the Tri-
Faith image was harnessed to the causes of legal pluralism and non-
establishment in the 1950s and 1960s.35 3
352. See supra, note 1.
353. See generally SCHULTZ, supra note 22. Herberg's essay reflects the post-
World War II codification of these changes. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-
CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY 258 (reprint ed.
1983); see also GHANEA BASSIRI, supra note 24, at 235-38 (discussing Herberg).
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Although framed as an appeal to the virtues of religious
tolerance and social progress, the rise of Tri-Faith America had a
distinctly strategic and even opportunistic character to it. The social
integration of Catholic Americans, long associated with an absolutist
faith, proceeded not by way of an abstract and sudden commitment to
religious liberty, but through Catholic opposition to the putatively
intertwined specters of moral relativism and totalitarianism. 3 54 The
perception that all three groups-Protestants, Catholics, and Jews-
could coalesce around resistance to this shared political threat made
possible the rise of Judeo-Christian America and the discrediting of anti-
Catholic prejudice. 355 That fundamentally political context for integration
and de-stigmatization is missing in post-9/11 America. Today, many
Americans identify Islam with religious absolutism and the political
enemies of the United States, rather than count it as an ally in a
dangerous world.3 57 Though reservoirs of interfaith goodwill exist, the
necessary political ingredients for the making of "Abrahamic America"
on a broad scale are not yet available. 3 58 At one level, we may be justly
relieved that this is the case, given the reactionary politics that have so
often accompanied invocations of both "Christian" and "Judeo-
Christian" America. 35 9
354. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 170 (1973).
355. In addition to SCHULTZ, supra note 22, see Andrew Preston, A Very
Young Tradition: Our Country's Religious Identity Is a Surprisingly New - And It
Hasn't Always Meant What It Does Now, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE (July 1, 2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/06/30/very-young-judeo-christian-
tradition/smZoWrkrSLeMZpLoulZGNL/story.html.
356. Cf DENISE SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON'S QUR'AN: ISLAM AND THE
FOUNDERS 298 (2013) (situating President Eisenhower's 1957 embrace of a newly
constructed Muslim "church" in Washington D.C. in the context of Cold War
opposition to "godless" Communism and noting that this context has been replaced
by an association between Islam and terrorism today).
357. See MARGULIES, supra note 15.
358. Hence my skepticism of Joppke's and Torpey's conclusion that there is
"little reason that Islam in the United States cannot find its place in the already
existing chain 'Protestant-Catholic-Jew'." JOPPKE AND TORPEY, supra note 5, at 116.
359. Cf BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN
SECULARISM 62-63 (2011). This is to say nothing of the inadequacies inherent in the
motif of an "Abrahamic" theological consensus. See AARON W. HUGHES,
ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS: ON THE USES AND ABUSES OF HISTORY (2012); JON D.
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This also means, however, that while we cannot account for the
crackdown on Muslim charities simply as a matter of selective
enforcement or anti-Muslim bias, nor can we simply assume that the
circle of religious liberty will inevitably expand to include each new
generation's disfavored minorities. There is no built-in impulse towards
"an ever expanding circle of inclusion" in the story of American
religious liberty.36o The political contexts shaped by large-scale historical
forces-totalitarianism and terrorism, war and peace, democracy and
secularization, etc.-do matter in the law. The translation of fungibility
from economic to national security terms is the product of such forces,
not an abstract invention of legal theory. The diminished space for
religious liberty that now prevails at the end of the first Terror Decade is
closed in by both long-term structural and recent characteristics of
church-state law: separation, church autonomy, the Smith decision to
some extent, and so on. There is no "general" account of law and religion
that can describe and account for these forces and changes at a normative
level. There is no theory of church and state that can alone capture what
is now happening at the nexus of mosque and state-itself a misleading
label for the challenges at hand. We will have to examine the situation of
religious minorities and majorities in their respective political, cultural,
and legal settings, and then also relate them to the more general contours
of the law of religious liberty, in order to keep up with the less visible
shifts that are underway as the era of the war on terror continues.
LEVENSON, INHERITING ABRAHAM: THE LEGACY OF THE PATRIARCH IN JUDAISM,
CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM (2012).
360. Cf. Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, supra note 349, at 174
("Fortunately, the history of religious liberty in America is a history of an ever
expanding circle of inclusion, both social acceptance and legal protection.").
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